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The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency is Africa’s oldest, lasting for over 25 
years. This work studies the LRA to find out why it has survived so long and how. A 
combination of empirical methods was used to analyze data related to the LRA and the 
countries affected by the LRA insurgency. The findings show that the LRA prolonged its 
insurgency by taking advantage of its environment, including elevation, watered areas, 
the road network, land cover, proximity to state capital, and moderate population density. 
The LRA also exploited the political situations in the region, such as the rivalry between 
Uganda and Sudan, and the fragility of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Central 
African Republic, South Sudan, and Sudan. Last, the LRA modified its organizational 
structure according to the political and military situations it encountered, which enabled it 
to adapt and evade the threat of termination. The effectiveness of these methods of 
survival depended on the intuition of the LRA leadership. The author recommends both 
kinetic methods to manhunt LRA leaders and non-kinetic (psychological) operations to 
degrade the LRA’s strength by encouraging mass defections from its ranks.  
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The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is a Ugandan insurgent outfit that was co-
founded in 1992 by the African warlord Joseph Kony. This occurred after its predecessor, 
the Uganda People’s Democratic Army (UPDA), and the government army—the 
National Resistance Army (NRA)—resolved their differences through a peace deal and 
agreed to dissolve the former. Since its founding, the LRA has continually fought the 
Ugandan government up until the present day (2015). The LRA claims to be fighting to 
establish a government in Uganda that is based on the biblical Ten Commandments, 
which later changed to fighting for freedom and equal political and economic 
opportunities for all Ugandans.1 The LRA has not been the only Ugandan rebel group; 
there have been several others. Most have either been defeated or, like the UPDA, have 
resolved their grievances with the government. The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), 
like the LRA, continues to fight the Ugandan government. One difference between the 
ADF and the LRA is the location of their respective sanctuaries: the ADF is located in 
eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) while the LRA operates in 
northwestern DRC, southeastern Central African Republic (CAR), and parts of western 
South Sudan. The LRA is the older of the two. 
The LRA is led by a semi-illiterate man (Joseph Kony), and has poorly trained 
forces, no logistic base, and no high-tech equipment or firearms. But it has frustrated 
many with its ability to evade termination for close to a quarter of a century. It is 
therefore interesting to explore in depth the strategies that the LRA has used to prolong 
its longevity and elude elimination. Identifying the LRA’s survival strategies may 
provide policy makers and scholars with ideas as to how to derive viable solutions to 
tenacious insurgencies. 
                                                 
1 See full story in Matsiko, Grace, “Uganda: LRA Peace Talks – The inside Story,” Africa Files, 
February 9, 2008, accessed April 3, 2015, http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=17171 and Scott 
Baldauf, “When Joseph Kony Almost Came in from the Cold,” Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 2012, 
accessed April 3, 2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Keep-Calm/2012/0309/When-Joseph-Kony-
almost-came-in-from-the-cold-Juba-peace-talks-video. 
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Politicians, scholars, the local population in Uganda, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and, indeed, other countries affected by the LRA insurgency all 
have their own theories to explain the LRA’s longevity. For example, a report by the 
International Crisis Group (ICG), an NGO, accuses the Ugandan government of not 
having the political will to end the LRA insurgency. According to the ICG, because the 
LRA no longer operates within Uganda, Uganda is no longer (or less) motivated to end 
the insurgency.2 Another NGO, the African Center for the Constructive Resolution of 
Disputes (ACCORD), asserts that the LRA’s survival is due to other factors, such as the 
support it receives from Sudan, the weakness of the counterinsurgency forces, and the 
benefits of war to some individuals charged with the duty of ending the insurgency.3   
Unfortunately, such theories, which are based on subjective analysis, unless 
otherwise substantiated with empirical evidence, can divert us from the truth. It is 
therefore prudent to conduct a systematic analysis of the LRA insurgency so as to present 
an empirically supported theory of how and why the LRA has prolonged the longevity of 
their insurgency project. 
This introductory chapter has four sections: the first states the objectives of this 
study, the second states the research question, the third describes the expected benefits 
that this study will contribute to knowledge about the LRA and similar insurgencies, and 
the last lays out this study’s overall framework.  
A. OBJECTIVE 
If you ask the Ugandan government or any of the states fighting the LRA in 
Africa how the LRA managed to evade termination for such a long duration, you are 
likely to get a variety of reasons, as discussed above. This is because there is no 
                                                 
2 See full discussion in International Crisis Group, “The Lord’s Resistance Army.” International Crisis 
Group, November 17, 2011, accessed February 27, 2015, 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/uganda/182-the-lords-resistance-army-end-
game.aspx. 
3 See the full argument in John Adhere and Grace Maina, “The Never-Ending Pursuit of the Lord’s 
Resistance Army: An Analysis of the Regional Cooperative Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA,” 




systematically researched evidence to support a given narrative as to why and how the 
LRA prolongs its longevity. 
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to explore the LRA insurgency 
systematically so as to identify the factors that actually enhance the survivability and 
resilience of the LRA. In other words, it intends to identify the strategies used by the 
LRA to prolong its lifespan as an insurgency. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
What strategies have been used by the LRA to prolong the longevity of its 
undertaking? 
C. THE BENEFITS OF THIS STUDY 
Globally, the LRA is not the only insurgent group that has managed to prolong its 
lifespan. There are other non-state actors that have continued to project insecurity, not 
only to specific geographical locations but to the whole world, such as the Taliban in 
Afghanistan, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Al Qaeda, the Al Shabaab in East 
Africa, and the Boko Haram in West Africa. Within East and Central Africa—a conflict-
prone region—there are several insurgent groups that continue to destabilize the region, 
among them, the Seleka rebels in the Central African Republic (CAR) that are fighting 
the CAR government, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) that 
is fighting the Rwandan government, the Forces for National Liberation (FNL) that is 
fighting the Burundian government, and the recent breakaway faction of the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army, the SPLA, which is fighting the SPLA government in Juba. 
The list is long, and there may not be an end to it; other insurgent groups may emerge in 
the future as well. 
This study is designed to establish how and why the LRA, as a sample rebel 
group, continues to survive. Knowing the strategies that the LRA uses to evade 
termination would give state governments insights into formulating the best 
counterinsurgency strategies to use to deal with such myriad of insurgent groups, more 
especially in the East and Central African region. Each state affected by the LRA 
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insurgency has its own explanation as to why the LRA keeps surviving, despite the fact 
that they have joined efforts under the African Union Regional Task Force (RTF) to fight 
the LRA.4 This study will therefore contribute in one way or another to uniting the 
coalition of African forces in devising winning strategies to end the LRA and other 
similar insurgencies in the region.   
D. THESIS FRAMEWORK 
This work is composed of five chapters, in addition to this introductory one 
(Chapter I). Chapter II reports on the literature review or intellectual inheritance and the 
identification of the key theoretical strategies, according to scholars, that insurgents use 
to survive the counterinsurgent onslaught. Chapter III provides the historical background 
of the LRA to keep the reader abreast of the roots of the LRA insurgency and the events 
it went through to date. Chapter IV lays out the study’s research design and covers the 
various methods of analysis used to answer the research question based on specific 
hypotheses. Chapter V is an analysis of the results, as well as the evaluation thereof. The 
final chapter (Chapter VI) draws conclusions based on the evaluation of the results, as 
well as provides policy recommendations for the readers of this work.  
                                                 
4 See the full explanation in Tumutegyereize, “What Will It Take to End the Conflict with the LRA?” 




II. INTELLECTUAL INHERITANCE 
This chapter introduces the contributions of other authors to the study of civil 
conflicts, insurgent organization design and management, and factors that shape and 
influence an insurgent organization’s survival. This intellectual inheritance is what this 
study is based on. The section that follows describes the onset of civil wars where the 
discussion focuses on the creation or formation of a counter-state organization that 
undertakes to challenge the state establishment. The third section examines the theory of 
the design of the insurgent organization and how it fits into the environment of operation. 
The fourth section looks at the survival strategies of insurgent organizations. The last 
section relates the literature reviewed to the LRA as an insurgent organization. 
A. THE ONSET OF CIVIL WARS 
The popular explanations for onset of civil wars are ethnic discrimination, wealth 
inequalities, access to contrabands, and availability of safe havens. Contrary to this claim, 
Halvard Buhaug and Jan Ketil Rod have empirically shown that territorial conflicts are 
more likely to occur in sparsely populated areas, near national borders, far from the 
capital cities, and in less rough terrain. Their findings also suggest that civil wars aimed 
at capture of state power are more prone in densely populated areas and near natural 
resource mines, like diamond mines.5 
The argument that ethnic and wealth diversity have less effect on the onset of civil 
war is supported widely by other authors including Fearon and Laitin,6 and Staniland7  
Abdulkader H. Sinno, in support of this claim, argues that ethnic groups, social classes, 
peoples, civilizations, religions, and nations do not engage in conflict or strategic 
interactions, but organizations do. It is organizations, formed deliberately or ad hoc, that 
                                                 
5 For full discussion, see Halvard Buhaug and Jan Ketil Rod, “Local Determinants of African Civil 
Wars, 1970–2001,” Political Geography 25 (2006): 315–35. 
6 This is examined in detail by James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil 
War,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75–90, doi:10.1017/
S0003055403000534 
7 For full discussion, see Staniland, Paul, Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and 
Collapse, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 17–35. 
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leverage ethnic or social agenda to attract its members and wage conflict in their name.8 
Furthermore, Michelle Hale Williams argues that, although ethnic divisions may exist 
and be used for mobilizing ethnic groups, such divisions are not static but, rather, more 
dynamic. Williams goes on to assert that language and religious differences can prove so 
flexible that they become central in fostering relationships that are more inclusive than 
ethnocentric among different ethnic groups. 9 These arguments show that there is no 
conflict that is instigated purely by an ethnic or any other form of social groupings. It is 
organizations that organize and portray conflicts to be based on social groupings. 
Salehyan, however, challenges Buhaug and Rod’s claim about extraterritorial 
havens. He argues that no insurgency can survive without having safe havens outside the 
confines of the target state.10 Both the claims by Buhaug and Rod, and by Salehyan have 
their intrinsic limitations. The National Resistance Army (NRA) insurgency in Uganda 
(1981–1986) shows that the insurgents operated near the capital Kampala. The NRA’s 
intent was to capture state power, and therefore it is in line with Buhaug and Rod’s 
second claim.11 The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) insurgency in Sudan 
(1983–2005), however, shows that the insurgents operated far from the capital Khartoum. 
Like the NRA, the SPLA’s intent was to capture state power; however, contrary to 
Buhaug and Rod’s argument they did not operate near the state’s base.12 Neither the 
NRA nor the SPLA relied on extraterritorial haven to sustain their insurgency project, but 
                                                 
8 See full explanation in Abdulkader H. Sinno, “Armed Groups’ Organizational Structure and Their 
Strategic Options,” International Review of the Red Cross, June 30, 2011, accessed March 12, 2015, 
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/review-2011/irrc-882-sinno.htm. 
9 For details of the argument, see Michelle Hale Williams, “Grappling with Ethnic Difference in 
Multicultural Societies,” in The Multicultural Dilemma: Migration, Ethnic Politics, and State 
Intermediation, ed. Michelle Hale Williams (New York: Routledge, 2013), 15–29. 
10 See details in Idean Salehyan, Rebels without Borders: Transnational Insurgencies in World 
Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), 19–61and Idean Salehyan, “Transnational 
Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan,” Strategic Studies 
Institute, March 4, 2010, accessed March 12, 2015, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/
display.cfm?pubID=971. 
11 For a full discussion, see Ondoga Ori Amaza, Museveni’s Long March from Guerrilla to Statesman 
(Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Pub Ltd, 1998), 69–102 and Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Sowing the Mustard 
Seed: The Struggle for Freedom and Democracy in Uganda (London: Macmillan Education, 1997), 124–
175. 
12For full discussion on this, see Arop Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story of 
the Founding and Development of SPLM/SPLA (Charleston, SC: BookSurge Publishing, 2006), 59–386.  
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instead they operated from within the borders of their respective countries.13 This is 
contrary to Salehyan’s claim that all insurgents must have safe haven outside the target 
state’s boundaries to operate successfully. Therefore, there is need to conduct further 
investigations to ascertain the most sustainable argument. Currently, both the NRM (the 
political wing of the NRA) and the SPLA are in government. The NRA captured state 
power in 1986, while the SPLA used peace talks and a popular referendum to gain state 
power, officially, in 2011.  
James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin claim that insurgencies are caused by 
conditions like poverty, as marked by state’s weakness, thus favoring rebel recruitment; 
political instability; rough terrain; and large population. Through empirical analysis, 
Fearon and Laitin show that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate that ethnic or 
religious diversity, stronger political grievances, and the end of the cold war as the root 
causes of insurgencies.14 
Fearon and Laitin’s arguments are supported by Yoweri Museveni and Ondoga 
Ori Amaza. The two authors, members of the NRA, participated in a protracted popular 
insurgency that was fought within the confines of Uganda’s borders, which are densely 
populated area, and are fairly rough terrain. The NRA declared war on President Obote’s 
government after the 1980 elections were reportedly rigged. The NRA claimed to be 
fighting to establish freedom and democracy in Uganda. Uganda, by then, was 
experiencing political instability and was more of a failed state than not.15 This argument 
is also in line with that of Buhaug and Rod that wars aimed at capture of state power are 
fought near the base of the state (the capital city) and resource deposits, and in densely 
populated areas.16 However the NRA insurgency was not based in areas richly endowed 
with mineral deposits. Instead, it relied on the local population for its basic logistic 
                                                 
13 See full discussion in Ibid. 59–386 and Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, 159–151. 
14 For full discussion, see Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75–90. 
15 For full discussion, see Amaza, Museveni’s Long March from Guerrilla to Statesman, 23–54; 
Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, 105–39; and Godfrey Mwakikagile, Uganda: A Nation in Transition: 
Post-Colonial Analysis (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: New Africa Press, 2012), 217–287. 
16 For full discussion, see Buhaug and Rod, “Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 1970–2001,” 
315–35. 
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supplies. However, it must be noted that, much as state weakness has influence in 
determining the onset of civil conflicts, Nicolas Berman and Mathieu Couttenier show 
that economic shock in the form of a drop in external income affects only the intensity 
and geography of conflicts within countries. It has less effect on the location of the onset 
of conflicts. Most conflicts start in remote areas that are not susceptible to economic 
shocks.17 
B. ORGANIZING THE INSURGENCY 
Richard L. Daft defines organizations as social entities that are goal-directed, 
designed as deliberately structured and coordinated activity systems, and linked to the 
external environment. Organizations shape the lives of their members, and well-informed 
managers can shape organizations. There are two dimensions of organizations. First, the 
structural dimension, which describes the internal characteristics of organizations, is used 
to measure and compare the efficiency as well as effectiveness of the organization.  It 
comprises the elements of formalization, specialization, hierarchy of authority, and 
centralization within the organization. The second dimension of an organization is its 
contingency factors, which are the large elements that influence and shape the structural 
dimension. These include organizational size, technology (the processes that convert 
inputs into outputs), environment (every element outside the organization that influences 
it), culture (the values, beliefs, understandings, and norms of the organization), and goals 
and strategy (the purpose and competitive edge that differentiate the organization from 
others). Organizations fall within two extreme design modes: the mechanistic or the 
organic. The mechanistic design is characterized by large size, efficiency strategy, stable 
environment, and rigid culture, and is normally used in manufacturing technology setup. 
Organic design, on the other hand, is characterized by small size, innovation strategy, 
changing environment, and adaptive culture, and is normally applicable in services 
technology setup.18 
                                                 
17 See details of this point of view in Nicolas Berman and Mathieu Couttenier, External Shocks, 
Internal Shots: The Geography of Civil Conflicts, SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network, March 1, 2014), accessed March 7, 2015, http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2444917. 
18 For full discussion, see Richard L. Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 11th ed. (Mason, OH: 
Cengage Learning, 2012), 1–169. 
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Daft's argument is that the organization shapes the activities and thus the behavior 
of its members. He also claims that the leadership of the organization shapes the 
organization. In other words, the leadership shapes the behavior of the members of the 
organization by designing and shaping the structure of the organization. Daft also noted 
that the environment in which the organization operates cannot be ignored because it has 
direct influence on the operations and thus survival of the organization. It will, therefore, 
be interesting to find out whether LRA depends on its leadership and environment to 
prolong the longevity of its survival, based on Daft’s arguments. 
Idean Salehyan argues that rebel organizations are not confined to a single 
geographic unit (country) but rather, they span international boundaries. Civil wars thus 
often result in international disputes and sometimes escalate into interstate wars. 
Therefore, there is nothing “domestic” about civil wars and conflicts because they always 
result in inter-state tensions. Salehyan asserts that war must be viewed beyond the 
confines of the state (state-centric); we must take into account the regional dynamics of 
the conflict and the linkages between civil and international wars.19 Salehyan thus argues 
that states must recognize the transnational nature of insurgencies and take it as their 
common problem. They may therefore need to engage in constructive dialogue and 
common counterinsurgency strategies. This will also enhance friendly interstate relations. 
The lack of these cooperative steps may escalate the conflict to regional status.20 
Salehyan’s arguments are correct but not without exceptions. The SPLA/M fought 
with the Sudanese government from within the confines of Sudan’s borders.21 Again, the 
NRA/M did not have any external base; it launched and accomplished its mission from 
within the confines of Uganda.22 Maybe the argument should be based on the target 
                                                 
19 This is explained fully in Salehyan, Rebels without Borders, 19–61. 
20 See detailed discussion in Salehyan, “Transnational Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional 
Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan.” 
21 For full discussion on this exception, see Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace, 59–391 and 
others including Peter Adwok Nyaba, The Politics of Liberation in South Sudan (Kampala, Uganda: 
Fountain Publ., 1996) and Lam Akol, SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration (New York: iUniverse, Inc., 
2003). 
22 For full discussion, see Amaza, Museveni’s Long March from Guerrilla to Statesman, 54–117 and 
Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, 105–177. 
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state’s ability to control its sovereign territory and deny it to the counter-state elements 
rather than the availability of safe havens across the border. Some states are weak and 
unable to prevail in all their sovereign territory. That is why there is this phenomenon of 
ungoverned spaces that are under the control of non-state actors. The non-state actor can 
thus use the ungoverned territory as a safe haven or base to coordinate its activities 
against the state establishment and may eventually overrun the state authority altogether. 
Paul Staniland reports that how insurgents are organized influences their 
survivability.  He further argues that the organization of insurgents is shaped by the 
prewar networks of the insurgent leaders. This may result in any one of four types of 
insurgent organizations: integrated—characterized by leadership unity, discipline, and 
high level of local compliance; vanguard—characterized by robust central control but 
fragile local control; parochial—characterized by having weak central discipline but 
robust local control; and fragmented—characterized by its lack of organizational 
control, at either the central or local levels. This also explains why insurgent groups with 
a similar ideology, ethnicity, state enemy, and resource flows still have different forms of 
organization. However, the organizational styles also change with prewar politics, 
counterinsurgent strategies, the insurgents’ innovations, and international interventions 
during the war. The cohesion of the insurgents shapes how the war is fought, how the war 
ends, and how politics plays out after the war. The prospects for peaceful negotiations 
and state building after the war also depend on the cohesion and the organization of the 
insurgents. Staniland argues that focusing on state structure and policies, material 
resources, ideology, and mass support to explain insurgent organization “suffers from 
important limitations.”23 He stresses that the study of insurgent groups must take the 
historical connotations of the conflicts seriously.24 
Although it is true that insurgents change organization structure in response to 
changes in the prevailing conditions, such as change in counterinsurgent’s strategies and 
the reciprocal insurgent innovations, it may not be absolutely correct to say that ideology 
and the quest for mass mobilization do not play roles in determining how insurgents 
                                                 
23 For detailed discussion on this, see Staniland, Networks of Rebellion, 1–59. 
24 See Ibid, 5. 
 11 
organize. For instance, the organization structure of the NRA was based on the ideology 
the leaders held; that is, a force whose relationship with the population is sacrosanct. As 
such, it had/has political positions within its military structure with the role of linking the 
military with the population.25 This structure serves the purpose of ideology, but in the 
process it also acts as a mass mobilization tool.    
Abdulkader H. Sinno shows that the organizational structure of armed groups 
affect their strategic options during conflict and at the time of entering peace agreements. 
They may have either a centralized, decentralized, networked, or patronage-based 
organizational structure. Conversely, only centralized armed organizations have the 
leverage to make strategic options like “divide and conquer,” “co-option,” and “hearts 
and minds,” and also engage in successful peace agreements. Furthermore, centralized 
insurgent organizations are especially vulnerable, when they do not have safe haven in 
the contested territory. This also explains why counterinsurgent forces are less interested 
in peace talks with centralized insurgent organizations.26 
Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter found empirical support for 
Sinno’s “winning hearts and minds” argument and showed that improved service 
provision and coercion reduces insurgent violence. A government seeking to curtail 
insurgent violence can thus use the strategy of “hearts and minds.”27 Sinno’s argument 
about the vulnerability of centralized insurgent organizations is in line with that of 
Gordon McCormick. McCormick argues that the state, as the prevailing authority in a 
country, has force advantage. Therefore, if the insurgent is centralized, then it is visible 
(they have specific positions where the counterinsurgent can find them), and so the state 
has to simply apply force to destroy it. On the other hand, the decentralized insurgent 
organization, instead, has information advantage and is not visible (hidden) to the state 
forces. In this case, the state may be powerful but will have nowhere to unleash its 
                                                 
25 See details in Amaza, Museveni’s Long March from Guerrilla to Statesman, 34–37 and Museveni, 
Sowing the Mustard Seed, 178.  
26 For full discussion, see Sinno, “Armed Groups’ Organizational Structure and Their Strategic 
Options,” 1–99. 
27 For details on this, see Eli Berman, Jacob N. Shapiro, and Joseph H. Felter, “Can Hearts and Minds 
Be Bought? The Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq,” Journal of Political Economy 119, no. 4 
(August 2011): 766–819. 
 12 
superiority.28 This argument is also supported by Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom in 
their book The Starfish and the Spider, where they argue that centralized organizations 
are vulnerable to destruction like the spider—pluck off the head of a spider, and its life 
ends—while decentralized organizations, like the starfish, are more resilient to 
destruction—cut off a finger of a starfish, and it still survives.29 
Jeremy M. Weinstein argues that there are two types of insurgent organizations: 
one that is resource independent and one that is resource strained. The former, because of 
being resource content, unleashes indiscriminate violence against civilian populations, 
whereas the latter does not because it depends on the civilian population for its resource 
base. Weinstein thus argues that most resource independent rebel groups are composed of 
undisciplined, materialists, and are unlikely to succeed in their endeavors. Resource-
constrained rebels, on the other hand, maintain a cordial relationship with the civilian 
population, which enhances their recruitment drive and hence survivability. In other 
words, the cause of insurgent violence is rooted in the organizational structure of the 
group.30 
Weinstein draws a link between resources, organization, and violence. His 
argument is supported by Museveni, who argues that the relationship between the 
insurgent forces and the civilian population is sacrosanct. This argument is also supported 
by Museveni’s colleague Ori Amaza.31 However, this line of thinking does not account 
for the relationship between the state and the insurgents and between the population and 
the state. These missing links may be significant contributors to the behavior of the 
insurgent forces. If the civilian population sides with the state, the insurgents may treat 
them differently than when they support the insurgents and vice versa.  
                                                 
28 For full discussion, see Gordon H. McCormick and Frank Giordano, “Things Come Together: 
Symbolic Violence and Guerrilla Mobilization,” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 295–320, doi: 
10.1080/01436590601153705 and Gordon H. McCormick, “Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare” (Lectures, 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, winter 2014). 
29 For full discussion, see Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider: The 
Unstoppable Power of Leaderless Organizations, Reprint edition (New York: Portfolio Trade, 2008), 1–29. 
30 See detailed explanation in Jeremy M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent 
Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1–96. 
31 See full discussions, in Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed. 177–180 and Amaza, Museveni’s Long 
March from Guerrilla to Statesman, 54–69. 
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C. KEEPING THE INSURGENCY PROJECT SURVIVING  
Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Paivi Lujala, using a contest-success function 
model, show that geographic factors such as location, terrain, and natural resource 
deposits interact together with the military capacity of the rebels to determine the 
duration of a conflict. They explained that civil conflicts that are fought far from the base 
of the state and are located at remote international borders that are endowed with rich 
mineral deposits, contribute significantly in determining the longevity of the conflict. 
They conclude that the distance counterinsurgent forces have to travel to project power, 
the rebels’ fighting capacity, and the geographical characteristics of the conflict region 
affects how the civil war is fought and who will eventually prevail.32 
This is an interesting argument that warrants further investigation. Some of the 
factors mentioned in this argument are independently supported by other authors. For 
instance, Weinstein argues in support of resource availability and military capacity, 
which is in part determined by organization structure. Fearon and Laitin argue in support 
of the factors of terrain and location as important in insurgent operations.33 It will be 
interesting to explore and find out whether the LRA relied on these factors to prolong the 
longevity of its insurgency project. 
Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas contend that states are sometimes unable to 
prevail in all spaces within the domain of their sovereignty, which results in ungoverned 
spaces. They further claim that such ungoverned spaces attract alternative governments 
that try to fill the gap left by the absence of the state. Such non-state centric governments, 
they argue, are there to provide what the state has failed to provide as a legal authority. 
They recommend that if the non-state government poses no threat to international 
                                                 
32 See detailed discussion in Halvard Buhaug, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala, “Geography, Rebel 
Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 4 (August 1, 2009): 
544–69, doi: 10.1177/0022002709336457. 
33 For full discussion, see Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 163–198; Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, 
Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75–90. 
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security, then states should cooperate with them in a phenomenon called softened 
sovereignty.34 
Rabasa and his co-authors at the RAND Corporation argue that ungoverned 
territories emerge as a result of failure of the state to control all its sovereign territory. 
They identify three types of ungoverned territories: contested, incomplete, and abdicated. 
Contested territories are those in which the state and the alternative government (non-
state actor) are contesting to establish their authority. The incomplete territory is where 
the state has some control, but not absolute control. The abdicated territory is where the 
state decided to relegate authority to the non-state actor. They assert that ungoverned 
territories are responsible for harboring insurgents and terrorists, hence a source of global 
insecurity. They recommend stronger states to support weaker states to get rid of 
ungoverned territories prevalent in developing nations.35 
Ungoverned territories are characterized by, among other things, an absence of 
state authority, remote environment far from the base of the state, rough terrain, poor 
social services like water sources, health centers, and infrastructure. Other factors are 
informal business activities and ephemeral local administration. Insurgent and terrorist 
groups like the LRA, which is armed with firearms and therefore more powerful than 
local authorities, may invade and take over such territories. In East and Central Africa, 
such territories are plentiful, and this could be the reason why the LRA keeps surviving 
despite having no logistic base. 
D. THE LITERATURE AND THE LRA 
Is it true that an insurgent’s duration of sustaining a conflict is dependent on its 
location, terrain, natural resource deposits, and military capacity, as argued by Buhaug 
and co-authors? Could it be how the LRA is organized that is responsible for its ability to 
evade termination? Is it because of the presence of ungoverned spaces that the LRA 
                                                 
34 For full discussion, see Anne L. Clunan and Harold A. Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces: 
Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 
2010), 17–34. 
35 See detailed explanation in Angel Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and 
Reducing Terrorism Risks, Advance review copy edition (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), 
1–44. 
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thrives in East and Central Africa? The author intends to use these arguments, theories, or 
models derived from the literature reviewed as part of the hypotheses to ascertain why the 
LRA insurgency has survived for such a long duration (27 years since 1988). An 
overview of the LRA insurgency shows some truth in these arguments. The LRA is 
hundreds of miles from Uganda. The terrain in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC), the Central African Republic (CAR), Republic of South Sudan (RSS), and Sudan 
is relatively rough. These countries are blessed with various types of natural resources. 
And the LRA seems to have mastered guerrilla warfare in its crudest form. There are 
also, arguably, plenty of ungoverned spaces in this region.36 It may also be interesting to 
know why the LRA did not relocate eastwards to Somalia, Ethiopia, or Kenya, because it 
was operating nearer those countries, instead of crossing the Nile (an obstacle) to go 
westwards to the DRC.  
                                                 
36 See details in IHS, “Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA),” Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, July 
2014, accessed March 2, 2015, https://janes.ihs.com/Grid.aspx, and Enough Project Team, “Kony to LRA: 
‘Bring Me Ivory, Gold, and Diamonds’ | Enough,” Enough: The Project to End Genocide and Crimes 
against Humanity (November 19, 2014), accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/reports/
kony-lra-bring-me-ivory-gold-and-diamonds. 
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III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE LRA INSURGENCY 
This chapter provides a brief history of the LRA as an insurgent organization 
from the time it was created up until 2015. For the purpose of easy comprehension, 
coherency, and clarity, the chapter has been divided into five sections. The first section 
narrates the story of the origin of the LRA as an amalgamation of insurgent groups from 
Acholi districts. The second describes the operations of the LRA as an insurgent 
organization, that is, how the LRA engaged in and conducted the business of insurgency. 
The third tells the story of how the LRA game changed when the Sudanese decided to 
sign a peace deal, and how the LRA used the wake of the Sudanese peace deal to succeed 
in its next maneuver. The fourth reports on how things fell apart when the LRA snubbed 
the signing of the Juba peace agreement. The fifth and final section is the conclusion to 
the chapter. 
A. THE GENESIS OF THE LRA INSURGENCY 
On July 27, 1985, Tito Okello, Basilio  Okello, and their cohort, then soldiers of 
the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), mutinied against the government of 
President Milton Obote and dislodged him from power in a coup d’état. Tito Okello was 
appointed President. This group was composed mostly of people from the Gulu and 
Kitgum districts, that is, members of the Acholi tribe who accused Obote of tribalism. 
Obote was from the Langi tribe, which neighbors the Acholis in northern Uganda. During 
this chaotic situation, the National Resistance Army (NRA) was busy fighting the Obote 
government from the outskirts of Kampala city. Tito Okello’s government, in a bid to co-
opt the NRA and stabilize the country, called on the NRA to talk peace. Kenyan 
President Daniel Arap Moi offered to mediate the talks in the Kenyan capital city of 
Nairobi, and a peace deal was reached in December 1985. The Okellos thus expected the 
NRA to join them in a new transitional umbrella government by 1986.37 
                                                 
37 For full discussions on this, see Mwakikagile, Uganda, 217–281; Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena & 
the Holy Spirits: War in Northern Uganda 1986-97 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2000), 22–36; 
Amaza, Museveni’s Long March from Guerrilla to Statesman, 5–23; and Museveni, Sowing the Mustard 
Seed, 169–175. 
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On January 25, 1986, to the astonishment of the Okellos, the National Resistance 
Army/Movement (NRA/M) marched on Kampala, dislodging the Okellos from power. 
Probably, the NRA/M had little or no confidence in the transitional government to be 
established. The following day, January 26, the NRA/M officially announced the 
takeover of government. Tito Okello and his cohort fled the country, with many of them 
taking refuge in neighboring Sudan (currently South Sudan). By April 1986, the NRA 
had reached the northern border of Uganda, further displacing remnants of the UNLA 
into Sudan. In late 1986 and early 1987, the former UNLA soldiers and some members of 
the Acholi tribe displaced by the civil war regrouped as Uganda Peoples’ Democratic 
Army (UPDA) and launched counter offensive against the NRA/M government in 
Uganda with the support of the Sudanese government.38 
In 1986, as the NRA/M was still trying to settle as a government, an Acholi 
priestess, Alice Auma, a traditional healer, formed a parallel rebel group to that of the 
UPDA. Auma claimed that she was possessed by a spirit called Lakwena, meaning the 
“messenger.” She accordingly proclaimed to be a mystical spiritual conduit for Lakwena 
to the Acholi and Uganda at large. Her Holy Spirit Movement/Mobile Force (HSMF) 
fought against the NRA, capturing substantial part of northern and eastern Uganda. In 
1987, however, the HSMF suffered a defeat when it reached Jinja, about 80 kilometers 
from Kampala city, and Auma and some of her followers fled to Kenya where she 
eventually died from illness in 2007.39 
Joseph Kony, the current leader of the LRA, comes from a small village near 
Gulu call Odek. He was brought up in the Catholic faith but dropped out of school at an 
early age. By 1987, Kony was a soldier in the UPDA at the age of 26 years. One day, 
while at home on leave, he was reported to have been possessed by some spirits and 
                                                 
38 See detailed discussions in Museveni, Sowing the Mustard Seed, 180–183; Christopher Day, “The 
Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda,” City University of New York 43, no. 4 (July 2011): 439–58; IHS, 
“Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)”; and Timothy Kalyegira, “Uganda after 1986: Insurgencies in the North 
and East (Part One),” The Daily Monitor, December 11, 2012, accessed September 13, 2014, 
http://www.monitor.co.ug/SpecialReports/ugandaat50/Uganda-after-1986--Insurgencies-in-the-north-and-
east--Part-One-/-/1370466/1640922/-/r3rf7/-/index.html. 
39 For full discussions on this, see Day, “The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda,” 439–58; IHS, 
“Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)”; and Behrend, Alice Lakwena & Holy Spirits, 22–100. 
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could not speak for three days. Later, when some Christians (Balokole) joined hands in 
prayers and drove away the evil spirits, he opened his mouth. It is reported that from that 
time onwards, he became a conduit for ten different spirits (see Appendix A for list), 
which he claimed were holy ones. Heike Behrend, partly quoting de Heusch, reported 
thus: 
In his first speech, he [Kony] said he had been sent by God to liberate 
humanity from disease and suffering. But, he added, he had discovered 
that healing was senseless as long as those who were healed were killed. 
So he resolved to fight to destroy all those who wanted to fight. The 
struggle would last until no one had the wish to fight any longer. He said 
he had not come to topple government, but to destroy the evil forces in the 
world as well as the abila (the shrines of the ancestors), amulets, and all 
forms of witchcraft and sorcery. He said he had come to teach people to 
follow God. His coming to Acholi [the territory] did not mean he was 
privileging the Acholi [the tribe], but that he wanted justice and 
righteousness to reign throughout the country [Uganda].40 
Immediately after acquiring the mediumship for the spirits, Kony embarked on 
mobilizing troops by mainly attacking other insurgent groups within Acholi region. These 
included the UPDA, HSMF, and other minor spirit-based resistance groups. His mission 
was to co-opt all of them under his command (see list of co-opted spirits in Appendix B). 
Those refusing to join Kony’s Holy Spirit soldiers, by then called the Lord’s Army, were 
imprisoned or ransomed for logistical supplies. The Lord’s Army operated like Alice 
Auma’s HSMF: it had Holy Spirit safety precautions (see Appendix C) as its rules and 
regulations, and the Holy Spirit tactics, which they used for fighting their enemy. 
Meanwhile, the UPDA, under its commander Odong Latek, continued the fight 
against the NRA/M until 1988 when its faction under Angelo Okello decided to sign a 
peace agreement with the Ugandan government. President Museveni had already 
announced an amnesty for any insurgent who wished to renounce rebellion and return 
home. The agreement between Angelo Okello and the NRA co-opted some of the 
UPDA’s forces, while others became members of the Local Defense Units (LDUs), 
whose responsibility was to protect the villages from attacks by insurgents. This 
                                                 
40 See quote in Behrend, Alice Lakwena & Holy Spirits, 179. 
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agreement also temporarily halted Sudanese support to the UPDA. However, the UPDA, 
under Odong Latek, did not agree with the terms of the agreement and thus decided to 
join hands with Joseph Kony, who was by this time the leader of his reformed Uganda 
People’s Democratic  Christian Army (UPDCA). The UPDCA also recruited some 
members of Alice’s defeated forces to boost its strength. Odong Latek, a trained military 
officer, seemed to have had profound influence on Kony. By 1992, the UPDCA changed 
name to the Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/M) and changed from Holy Spirit 
tactics to classical guerrilla warfare. By this time, the LRA was the only Acholi-
originated insurgency still fighting the government of Uganda.41 
B. THE BEGINNING OF THE QUARTER-CENTURY-LONG RESISTANCE  
The LRA/M reactivated ties with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) so as to 
receive military supplies and special training from the Sudanese government. The 
government of Sudan had also granted the LRA sanctuaries within its territory. This 
facilitated the operations of the LRA greatly by giving the LRA the opportunity to rearm, 
train, farm, and maneuver back to Uganda to conduct operations. President Museveni was 
a former classmate of Dr. John Garang (the leader of the Sudanese rebel movement, 
Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Army/Movement—SPLA/M) while at Dar es Salaam 
University in Tanzania. The two leaders, naturally, cemented the ties between their 
armies. The SPLA operated from within the borders of Sudan, but it received supplies 
through the territory of Uganda. In essence, a proxy war situation was established: the 
LRA supported by SAF, fighting the Ugandan government, and SPLA supported by 
NRA, fighting the Sudanese government.42 
In 1994, the Islamic Republic of Iran tried to mediate a peace agreement between 
the governments of Uganda and that of the Sudan, but it never worked. The two countries 
                                                 
41 See full discussions in Day, “The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda,” 439–58 and Behrend, 
Alice Lakwena & Holy Spirits, 172–191. 
42 See details in Day, “The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda,” 439–58 and IHS, “Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA).” 
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continued to support the insurgents of each other, and so the proxy war situation 
continued.43 
On October 8, 1995, Uganda enacted a new constitution that transformed the 
NRA into a national military called Uganda Peoples’ Defense Forces (UPDF).44 
Nevertheless, the UPDF continued the fight against the LRA. It was just a change of 
name, but the operations and other routine activities of the UPDF continued unchanged. 
Between 1994 and 2004, the NRA and the UPDF (after 1995), continued to fight 
not only the LRA in northern Uganda, but also other insurgent groups in West Nile and 
the Western regions of the country. The LRA also kept making incursions from its base 
in Sudan to conduct operations in Uganda. The operations included mostly abductions, 
attacking weak UPDF detaches, raiding internally displaced people’s (IDP) camps, and 
ambushing both the UPDF and civilians. Several peace initiatives were organized by the 
local religious and political leaders to end the insurgency but to no avail. The fight 
between the LRA and the government of Uganda raged on.45  
In 2002, Uganda and Sudan negotiated a deal to allow the UPDF to cross the 
border into Sudan to conduct limited operations for three-month duration. As per the 
terms of the agreement, Uganda was given a red line south of Juba city that it could not 
cross while pursing the LRA. Uganda renewed the mandate over eight times. Meanwhile, 
the LRA relocated beyond the red line and kept bypassing the UPDF to conduct 
operations in Uganda.46 
The last serious incursion of the LRA into Uganda was in 2004. The LRA moved 
through northern to eastern Uganda. They were contained by locally mobilized militias 
                                                 
43 See Behrend, Alice Lakwena & Holy Spirits, 197. 
44 See details in Government of Uganda, “The Constitution | State House Uganda,” The State House of 
Uganda, 1995, accessed June 17, 2014, http://www.statehouse.go.ug/government/constitution. 
45 See full discussions in Apuuli Phillip Kasaija, “Civil Society and Conflict Resolution: The Role of 
the Acholi Religious Leaders’ Peace Initiative (ARLPI) in the Northern Uganda Conflict,” in Annual 
Conference of the International Society for Third Sector Research (ISTR), vol. 7, ICG Africa Report No. 77 
(Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict, Bangkok, Thailand: International Crisis Group 
(ICG), 2006). 
46 See the full story in IRIN, “UGANDA: Operation Iron Fist Agreement Renewed amid Tensions,” 
IRINnews, September 15, 200, accessed October 7, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/FR/Report/46151/
UGANDA-Operation-Iron-Fist-agreement-renewed-amid-tensions. 
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called Amuka boys from the Lango tribe and Arrow boys from the Itesot tribe. These 
groups were armed with rifles to defend the IDP’s camps in northern Uganda and the 
villages in eastern Uganda respectively. The plan was that the locally organized militias 
would protect the rear territory (parts of northern and eastern Uganda) while the UPDF 
confronted the LRA at the front in southern Sudan.47 However, because the LRA 
operated with small covert groups, they managed to penetrate deep behind the UPDF 
lines. As the militias confronted them together with some UPDF rear units, the LRA 
withdrew back to Sudan, leaving behind trails of massacres in their wake.48 
C. THE SUDANESE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT AND 
UGANDAN PEACE “JOKES” 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Sudanese government 
and the SPLA/M in 2005 changed the proxy war status quo. According to the CPA, 
SPLA/M was granted authority to govern southern Sudan semi-autonomously,49 which 
meant that the whole of southern Sudan came under the control of SPLA/M. Because 
SPLA/M was an ally of Uganda, it meant that the LRA had lost its ally’s control of the 
sanctuary territory. The sanctuary that the LRA reverted to during all the previous years 
had by then shifted into the control of the SPLA/M—an enemy of the LRA by extension. 
The LRA thus had four options: it could relocate to the countries in the west of Sudan 
(the DRC or the CAR); it could relocate eastwards to Ethiopia, Somalia, or Kenya; it 
could talk peace with Uganda government; or it could stay within the vast territory of 
southern Sudan and use guerrilla tactics to survive. 
                                                 
47 See full discussions in Maja Janmyr, “Recruiting Internally Displaced Persons into Civil Militias: 
The Case of Northern Uganda,” Nordic Journal of Human Rights 32, no. 3 (July 3, 2014): 199–219, 
doi:10.1080/18918131.2014.937203 and Peter Eichstaedt and Joseph Elunya, “Ugandan Militia Fights Off 
LRA,” Institute for War and Peace Reporting, January 24, 2006, accessed March 23, 2015, https://iwpr.net/
global-voices/ugandan-militia-fights-lra. 
48 See details in IRIN, “UGANDA: Focus on LRA Attack on Barlonyo IDPs Camp,” IRINnews, 
February 25, 2004, accessed November 30, 2014, http://www.irinnews.org/report/48732/uganda-focus-on-
lra-attack-on-barlonyo-idps-camp. 
49 See full document in Government of Sudan and SPLA/M, “Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
between Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement.” 2005, accessed 
January 2, 2015, http://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/comprehensive-peace-agreement-between-government-
republic-sudan-and-sudan-peoples 
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The LRA chose two options: First, it relocated to the west, in Garamba National 
Park in the DRC. Probably, the leaders of LRA realized the richness of game parks in 
terms of food supplies and plenty of ground with favorable terrain to maneuver in case of 
counterinsurgent onslaught. The DRC also harbors a number of other insurgent groups, 
and the LRA probably hoped to link up with them or survive independently. Second, it 
accepted the offer of a peace negotiation by the semi-autonomous government of 
southern Sudan (GOSS). Dr. Riek Machar, the GOSS vice president was selected to be 
the mediator. The Ugandan government also agreed to the talks, commonly referred to as 
the Juba peace accord. Given how events unfolded thereafter, one may also argue that the 
LRA could have used the peace talk option to achieve the relocation option. 
In 2006, as peace-talks were being held in Juba, with the LRA represented by the 
so-called LRA external wing, the LRA-proper relocated to Garamba National Park in the 
DRC. By late 2007, the peace-talks were through and the final signing of the agreement 
was to be held in Juba. However, to the astonishment of many, including the LRA 
negotiators, Kony decided to snub the agreement at the last minute. By this time, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) warrant of arrest for Kony and his other top four 
commanders had been issued. This could have contributed to Kony’s refusal to sign the 
agreement. He wanted the charges against him and his commanders dropped before he 
would sign the agreement.50 There are also reports that Kony was actually not interested 
in the peace agreement. Therefore, he had to find a reason to snub the agreement, and this 
was the best opportunity he had.51 
                                                 
50 See details in Thomas Reuters, “Uganda Violence,” Thomson Reuters Foundation (January 1, 
2011), accessed March 27, 2015, http://www.trust.org/spotlight/uganda-violence/. 
51 For full explanations on this, see Scott Baldauf, “When Joseph Kony Almost Came in from the 
Cold: Juba Peace Talks (+video),” Christian Science Monitor, March 9, 2012, accessed March 27, 2015, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Keep-Calm/2012/0309/When-Joseph-Kony-almost-came-in-from-the-
cold-Juba-peace-talks-video and Dylan Hendrickson and Kennedy Tumutegyereize, “Dealing with 
Complexity in Peace Negotiations: Reflections on the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Juba Talks | 
Conciliation Resources,” Conciliation Resources: Working Together for Peace, January 2012, accessed 
March 27, 2015, http://www.c-r.org/resources/dealing-complexity-peace-negotiations-reflections-
lord%E2%80%99s-resistance-army-and-juba-talks. 
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D. THINGS FALL APART! BACK TO THE SWORD 
In 2008, Uganda responded by launching a concerted attack on the LRA positions 
in the DRC in an operation dubbed Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT). The LRA was 
dispersed, and some of its members fled to the CAR, Sudan’s Darfur Region, and parts of 
Chad. By the time of this writing, LRA members are suspected to be located in the 
countries mentioned above, including parts of the new country—the Republic of South 
Sudan (RSS).52 
Since then, the LRA has continued to abduct and terrorize the civilian population 
in the DRC, CAR, and RSS. In 2011, the African Union officially designated the LRA a 
terrorist group. Since October 14, 2011, the United States has also joined the African 
Union Taskforce (AU RTF) deployed to track down the LRA. U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) serves as adviser to the AU RTF, which consists of forces from Uganda, 
the DRC, RSS, and CAR.53 
Since 2008, the RTF has scored a number of successes. Several junior to medium 
LRA commanders have been eliminated, and other senior commanders like Opio Makasi, 
Caesar Acellam, and Dominic Ongwen surrendered. The use of force may not be very 
effective now, but the non-kinetic method seems to be yielding some good results of 
                                                 
52 See full discussions in IRIN, “DRC: Civilians Suffer as Uganda Takes on LRA,” IRINnews, January 
20, 2009, accessed March 27, 2015, http://www.irinnews.org/report/82475/drc-civilians-suffer-as-uganda-
takes-on-lra; Richard Downie, “The Lord’s Resistance Army | Center for Strategic and International 
Studies,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 18, 2011, accessed March 28, 2015, 
http://csis.org/publication/lords-resistance-army; and Ledio Cakaj et al., “LRA Crisis Tracker,” LRA Crisis 
Tracker|The Invisible Children + Resolve, 2014, accessed July 3, 2014, 
http://lracrisistracker.com/#analysis. 
53 See details in UNOCA, “Fight against the LRA,” United Nations Regional Office for Central 
Africa: UNOCA, September 18, 2014, accessed February 4, 2015, http://unoca.unmissions.org/
Default.aspx?ctl=Details&tabid=3760&mid=6487&ItemID=539864; Enough Project Team, “The United 
States and the LRA,” Enough: The Project to End Genocide and Crimes against Humanity, 2015, accessed 
July 3, 2014, http://www.enoughproject.org/conflicts/lra/us-government-and-lra; and Downie, “The Lord’s 
Resistance Army.” 
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depleting the LRA senior command structure. Several defections have been recorded as a 
result radio communications encouraging LRA fighters to quit.54  
E. CONCLUSION  
The long story of the LRA clearly requires further investigations to ascertain 
exactly why this insurgent group managed to survive for so long. Could it be how the 
LRA is organized and the tactics it is using to fight that gives it such longevity? Is it the 
wise selection of sanctuaries and areas of operation that actually favors the LRA’s 
survival? What role do the population and the regional politics play in the survival of the 
LRA? The brief history of the LRA described in this chapter only provides clues about 
some of the factors mentioned in the above questions. It is therefore imperative that 
further investigation is conducted. It is hoped that such inquiry will give policy makers 
and scholars a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of insurgent survival.  
                                                 
54 See details in Max Delany, “Could LRA Commander’s Capture Help Net Joseph Kony? (+video),” 
Christian Science Monitor, May 14, 2012, accessed April 2, 2015, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Africa/2012/0514/Could-LRA-commander-s-capture-help-net-Joseph-Kony-video; and Moses Akena, 
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IV. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This chapter describes the analytic strategy of this study. The overall purpose is to 
gain knowledge in the area of insurgent survival techniques, more specifically, to 
understand the strategies used by the LRA to prolong the longevity of its insurgency 
project. According to the reviewed literature, there are specific factors that insurgents like 
the LRA rely on to sustain their insurgency undertaking. This analytic strategy therefore 
uses the data on LRA activities and relates it to those factors that other researchers have 
found to be responsible for prolonging the longevity of insurgencies. 
It must be noted that there are factors that affect both the insurgents and the 
counterinsurgents equally. The difference arises from the point of effective utility of 
one’s advantage. The state is a powerful organ that has more resources than the 
insurgents, and, as such, it has a force advantage over the counter-state. The counter-
state, on the other hand, is less powerful but possesses an information advantage over the 
state, represented by the counterinsurgent. The state has a responsibility to maintain 
peace and security in the country. The counter-state, on the other hand, strives for 
survival and keeping the counterinsurgent engaged in battles or a “hide and seek” 
insurgency game at a time and space of its choice. The longevity of the insurgency 
therefore depends on how well the counter-state and the state play this game. The state 
fights to end the insurgency while the counter-state fights to survive and weaken the 
state, thus prolonging the insurgency.55 
This chapter has three sections. The first describes the data on the LRA’s 
significant activities, which is the dependent variable for this work. The second describes 
some of the factors that are believed to contribute to the longevity of insurgency projects 
based on the literature reviewed. The last section outlines the method of analysis used to 
analyze the dependent and the independent variables. 
                                                 
55 See full discussion in McCormick and Giordano, “Things Come Together: Symbolic Violence and 
Guerrilla Mobilization.” Third World Quarterly 28, no. 2 (2007): 295–320. 
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A. THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dependent variable data used in this work are from the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program, Georeferenced Events Datasets (UCDP/GED), which was last updated in 2012. 
UCDP/GED data captures instances of political violence in Africa quite sufficiently.56 
However, for the purpose of this work, only datasets related to the LRA insurgency have 
been extracted for analysis. The instances recorded in that data consist of violence against 
civilians by the insurgents, battles between the insurgents and the counterinsurgent 
forces, and non-violent activities such as peace talks, setting up of defensive locations, or 
engaging in a peaceful way with civilians. The data also captures the date of each data 
point in addition to the approximate geographical location of each event. It must be noted 
that whatever activity is recorded, as long as it concerns the LRA, it is considered a data-
point for this analysis. This is because each of the events happened with the overall 
mission of operations against the LRA insurgency. In other words, it does not matter 
whether the event is peaceful or violent as long as it has that overarching link to the LRA 
insurgency where each side strives to win through any means available to them.  
B. THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
The independent variables consist of factors that are thought to be responsible for 
the survival of an insurgent group like the LRA. The hypotheses stated under this section 
have been derived from the literature review covered in Chapter II. The factors have been 
categorized into three broad categories, including geographical, political, and 
organizational and leadership components. Each of these categories is represented by 
various elements that the author and the literature reviewed alluded to as essential 
ingredients for insurgent survival. 
                                                 
56 See the full data codebook in Ralph Sundberg, Mathilda Lindgren, and Ausra Padskocimaite, 
“Georeferenced Event Datasets,” UCDP GED Global Instances of Political Violence, November 15, 2012, 
accessed October 23, 2015, http://www.ucdp.uu.se/ged/data.php and for quality of the data see Kristine 
Eck, “In Data We Trust? A Comparison of UCDP GED and ACLED Conflict Events Datasets,” 
Cooperation and Conflict 47, no. 1 (2012): 124–41. 
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1. Geographical Factors 
The term geography refers to the study of places and the relationship between 
people and their environment. Geography has two main branches: physical geography, 
which studies landforms, seasons, streams, atmosphere, and soils; and human geography, 
which studies the distribution of networks of people and cultures on earth.57 This section 
covers the physical and human geography elements that are essential for the survival of 
an insurgent group.  
a. Physical Geography 
The essential physical geography elements that are key in influencing the 
operations and livelihood of an insurgent organization that is using the terrain for survival 
are elevation, the vegetation cover, mineral deposits, and the location of the base of the 
state—state capital. Each of these elements play a unique role in enhancing the longevity 
of an insurgent group like the LRA. 
(1) Elevation  
Elevation is a description of the shape of the earth’s surface in terms of height 
above sea level. In simple terms, it describes the shape of the earth in terms of mountains, 
hills, planes, and valleys. Of interest here is how elevation influences the activities and 
the livelihood of the insurgents. As a military organization, an insurgent group would 
draw from the tactical advantages the terrain that a territory would offer. For example, 
raised grounds offer suitable observation posts (OPs), which the insurgent would use as 
look-out positions to spot the counterinsurgent forces long before they approach their 
positions. This gives the insurgents information advantage over the counterinsurgent 
forces. It lets them prepare tactical actions, like laying ambushes or finding hideouts if 
they do not wish to engage in a battle. Raised grounds also offer suitable gun positions 
(GP) for weapons like surface to air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft guns (AAG), anti-
personnel machine guns, and artillery guns of various calibers. When such weapons are 
placed on raised ground, they have wider fields of fire for engaging potential targets. 
                                                 
57 See details in National Geographic, “What Is Geography?,” National Geographic Education, 2015, 
accessed March 17, 2015, http://education.nationalgeographic.com/education/what-is-geography/. 
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Such grounds are also suitable for setting up defensive positions. The logic here is that an 
adversary who is located on raised ground is much harder to uproot than one who is 
located on lower ground. Terrain with such unique advantages is called ground of tactical 
importance (GTI) in military terms.58 
There is 30m Shuttle Rather Topography Mission (SRTM) elevation data 
available for each country from the DIVA GIS website.59 The author used this data to 
visualize the landscape of East and Central Africa and thereafter analyze its relationship 
with the LRA insurgency in this region. It must be noted that elevation as a geographical 
element does not change much in a period of a century, so the age of the data does not 
have any significant influence on the integrity and reliability of the data. The author’s 
assertion in using elevation as a geographical effect factor is stated in the first hypothesis 
thus: 
H1 The LRA activities are positively associated with the high grounds in East 
and Central Africa. 
The assumption the author makes is that the East and Central Africa region 
provides suitable GTIs for the LRA, which the LRA uses to gain tactical advantage over 
the counterinsurgent forces. These tactical advantages offer the LRA the cumulative 
gains that enhance its operations and longevity. 
(2) Water Coverage 
Water coverage plays a very critical role in enhancing the life of all living things. 
An insurgent group like the LRA that does not have modern equipment to drill the 
ground for water or ferry water from clean water sources to supply its forces would have 
to rely on Mother Nature for its water supply. The DIVA GIS website offers water 
coverage data, including locations of rivers, canals, and lakes for countries in East and 
                                                 
58 See full explanation in US Army, “Tactics in Counterinsurgency FM-24.2,” Active FM: Army 
Doctrine and Training Publications, April 2009, accessed March 17, 2015, http://armypubs.army.mil/
doctrine/Active_FM.html. 
59 See details of data source in DIVA-GIS, “Free Spatial Data,” DIVA-GIS Free Spatial Data, 2015, 
accessed March 3, 2015, http://www.diva-gis.org/Data. 
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Central Africa.60 This DIVA GIS data was last updated in 2000, which is midrange of the 
dependent variable’s data range (1989–2010).  The author is aware of the impact of 
climate change on watered areas, but since the data is a midpoint data, it is assumed that 
the effect of climate change will not have significant integrity and reliability effects. The 
second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H2 The LRA activities are positively associated with the proximity of water 
bodies in the region. 
The assumption the author makes is that the water drainage in the region greatly 
enhances the survivability of the LRA insurgents and therefore the longevity of the 
insurgency.  
(3) Landcover or Vegetation   
The vegetation described here refers to the cover of the earth’s surface with grass, 
shrubs, trees, and so forth. The DIVA-GIS website has data on landcover of all the East 
and Central African countries where the LRA operates. Vegetation, unlike elevation data, 
is affected by change in climate and human activity. However, the DIVA-GIS Data was 
last updated in 2011, which means it reflects the true vegetation in the region within the 
time period under consideration (1989–2010).61 In military tactics, vegetation plays an 
important role of ensuring cover and concealment. In military terms, cover, as provided 
by vegetation, refers to protection mainly from visibility, but sometimes protection from 
small firearms that do not penetrate through wood to hurt a person. Concealment, on the 
other hand, refers to achieving protection by blending with the surrounding area through 
camouflage or other means that prevents the adversary from observing the difference 
between the environment and what is being concealed. Vegetation also provides firewood 
for cooking and warming, and poles for shelter construction for forces camped in the 
bush. Some trees and shrubs are also medicinal and are therefore used to treat various 
types of diseases. Besides, some trees provide human beings with food through their 
fruits, leaves, stems, and roots. Very thick vegetation cover, however, has negative 




effects as well. Thick jungles inhibit maneuverability of forces and reduce visibility, thus 
the enemy can easily close in unnoticed. Furthermore, jungles are infested with 
dangerous snakes, among other perils. It may therefore be prudent for the insurgents to 
locate themselves in areas with moderate vegetation cover. In other words, moderate 
vegetation cover directly contributes to the livelihood of man. The third hypothesis can 
therefore be stated thus: 
H3 The LRA activities are positively related to the location of areas with 
moderate vegetation cover. 
The assumption of the author is that the vast vegetation cover of East and Central 
Africa greatly enhances the operations and the livelihood of the LRA insurgents. The 
LRA does not have a well-organized logistic system; it depends entirely on nature and the 
local population for its supply of food and shelter. It also employs the landcover to 
enhance its tactical maneuvers. 
(4) Mineral Resources 
Mineral Resources are important sources of income for both states and non-state 
actors. The source of data for the mineral variable is from U.S. Geographical Society 
database, which covers all mineral works in East and Central Africa.62 The author used 
this data to test the relationship between mineral deposits in East and Central Africa 
region and the LRA insurgency. The data is in shapefile format and includes all mineral 
mining and prospective mining locations in Africa. The general assumption here is that 
the insurgents need the minerals to finance their undertaking. Items like firearms and 
ammunition are not easily obtainable without formidable financing. Yet funds are not 
easily obtainable without business activities involving huge exchange of money. Deals in 
diamonds, gold, and or other precious metals that attract a lot of cash for a small quantity 
are highly marketable. Based on this assumption, the fourth hypothesis is stated thus: 
H4 LRA activities are closely associated with the presence of mineral 
resources. 
                                                 
62 See details of data in USGS, “Mineral Operations outside the United States,” United States 
Geographical Society, 2015, accessed March 3, 2015, http://mrdata.usgs.gov/mineral-operations/. 
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(5) Road Networks 
Road networks form another important factor that influences the operations of 
both insurgent and counterinsurgent forces. The data for this variable was obtained from 
Environmental Systems Research Institute’s (ESRI) free shapefiles for Africa. The data is 
up to date as of 2014.63 Roads are, however, more sought after by the counterinsurgent 
forces because they need them for supplies and maneuvering especially when using 
combat vehicles. The absence of roads greatly affects the efficiency of counterinsurgent 
forces given their heavy armament. On the other hand, the insurgents only use the roads 
network to facilitate their movement when the counterinsurgent forces are far from their 
location. The LRA, in particular, depends less on roads but more on paths. This is 
because their primary means of transport is walking. The counterinsurgent forces are 
armed with combat vehicles, which make it easier for them to catch up with the 
insurgents if the insurgents use roads. It must be noted that it is not uncommon to find 
roads well marked on a map but “unmotorable” on the ground, especially during rainy 
seasons in Africa. For the purpose of this work, the author assumes all the roads are 
functional. Therefore, based on this assumption, the fifth hypothesis can be stated thus: 
H5 LRA activities are not positively associated with the proximity of roads 
network in the region. 
(6) Distance to the State Capital 
Distance from the state capital is one of the factors that determine where the 
insurgent operates. Insurgents, according to Buhaug and co-authors, prefer to operate 
near the capital city if their intention is to take over state power. Territorial insurgents, 
however, tend to operate far from the state capital.64 As noted earlier, the LRA claims to 
be fighting to capture state power. However, it has no significant activities that indicate it 
has actually operated near the capital of Uganda. The author thus advocates for the null 
                                                 
63 See details of data in ArcGIS, “Download Free African Continent ArcGIS Shapefile Map Layers,” 
Map Cruzin, September 9, 2014, accessed March 3, 2015, http://www.mapcruzin.com/free-africa-arcgis-
maps-shapefiles.htm. 
64 See full discussion in Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration 
of Civil Conflict.” 
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hypothesis. It must be noted that keeping away from the state capital makes the state feel 
less irritated by the activities of the insurgents. In other words, the farther away the 
insurgents are located, the less threatened the state is, and therefore, the less 
determination the state administrators have to act against the insurgents. Logic also 
shows that an insurgent cannot win state power by force of arms if it stays away from the 
capital. The hypothesis can therefore be stated thus: 
H6 LRA operations are not positively associated with close proximity to 
Uganda’s capital, Kampala. 
b. Human Geography  
There are human activities that have direct or indirect influence on the activities 
of insurgent groups. The essential element of human geography that the author thinks 
greatly influences the activities of the LRA is population density. 
(1) Population Density 
An insurgent group like the LRA, which does not have a strong logistics base, 
depends on the population for most of its food supplies. The assumption, therefore, is that 
it will most likely operate in moderately populated areas. Densely populated areas are, on 
the one hand, unsafe for hiding because the likelihood of bumping into civilians will 
always be high, thus alerting the counterinsurgent forces. On the other hand, unpopulated 
areas lack steady food production and supply. The insurgent must therefore choose an 
area that is moderately populated to remain hidden but also have steady access to food 
supplies. Based on this assertion, the seventh hypothesis is stated thus: 
H7 LRA operations are positively associated with moderately populated areas. 
There is data on population density of the whole of Africa from the Worldpop 
website. The author used the datasets for 2005 Africa population data to show the 
correlation between the LRA activities and the population distribution in the region.65 If 
                                                 
65 See details of data in Andrew Tatem, Catherine Linard, and Andrea Guaghan, “Worldpop: 




the hunch is correct, it is expected that LRA activities are located in areas that have 
moderate population density. 
2. Political Factors 
Politics always has some influence on the onset and sustenance of an insurgency. 
The author has identified two political factors that are thought to be very essential in 
determining the fate of an insurgency within a country: the economy of the country, and 
whether that country has a competing interest with its neighbor.  
a. State Economy 
The economy of a country determines its resource base and therefore its military 
capability. A country that is economically weak has a correspondingly weak military and 
most often, a weak military indicates a weak economy.  The Fund for Peace project (FFP) 
has calculated the Fragile State Indices from 2006 to 2014 for the world. This data 
highlights a state’s fragility by using several contributing parameters, such as poverty, 
security apparatus, public services, legitimacy of the government, unevenness of 
economic growth, human flight, and refugees and IDP camps, among other measures. 
These parameters spotlight the fragility of the state. Weak states have a higher total 
fragility index score than do stronger ones. The author used this data to show the relative 
weakness levels in the region of East and Central Africa and then correlates it with the 
activities of the LRA. The assumption is that the weaker the state, the more it will fail to 
contain or deter the LRA from operating within its sovereign territory. The eighth 
hypothesis can therefore be stated thus: 
H8 LRA activities are positively associated with the fragility of the state in 
which it operates. 
b. State Rivalry 
When two or more states have competing interests, opposition groups are likely to 
take advantage of that to pursue their own interests against the state. The rival state hosts 
the opposition elements in safe havens in its territory, and the target state does the same 
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with the opposition of the competing country.66 Data compiled by William R. Thompson 
shows states that were rivals between 1816 and 1999.67 This duration covers the first 
phase of the LRA insurgency. Using the same approach Thompson used, one can 
extrapolate the data using other references to indicate rivalry between states in the region 
after 1999. The ninth hypothesis is therefore stated thus: 
H9 LRA operations are positively associated to the presence of rivalry 
between Uganda and the states hosting the LRA in the region. 
If this hypothesis is true, then it is expected that the LRA is predominantly located 
in states that have competing interests with Uganda. This is because such states do not 
allow the Ugandan counterinsurgent forces to operate in its territory, which is another 
way of protecting the LRA from destruction, thus prolonging its longevity. 
3. Organizational and Leadership Factors 
The survival of an organization depends on two major elements: the 
organizational structure and its leadership. How the organization is structured determines 
how it fits into the environment in which it is located, and this is made possible by the 
approach and quality of the leadership. The leadership of the organization forms the most 
important component of the organization, holding the keys to both the survival and at the 
same time the death of the organization. 
a. Organization Structure 
Organizations are created with specific goals and purposes. The goals are those 
internal mission sets that the organization strives to achieve. The purposes are those that 
encompass responsibility to the society where the organization is located. In other words, 
the purpose of an organization is what determines its acceptability in the society where it 
operates. An organization does not fit within its environment if its purpose contradicts the 
                                                 
66 See full discussion in Salehyan, Rebels without Borders; Salehyan, “Transnational Insurgencies and 
the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan.” 
67 See details of data and a detailed explanation of how it was compiled in William R. Thompson, 
“Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 4 (December 
1, 2001): 557–86. 
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requirements of the environment; it will ultimately fail and collapse. The structure of the 
organization is determined by its functionality. According to Henry Mintzberg, 
organizations have three basic components based on their functionality. First, the key 
component, which is the strategic apex assisted by the middle-line managers, determines 
the success or failure of the organization. The second is the coordinating component that 
links the organization within and without, and it consists of the techno-structure and the 
support staff. The last component is the operating core, which performs the basic work 
related to production and services of the organization. These three components must 
work hand-in-hand to ensure the success of the organization internally as well as 
externally.68 The organizational structure of the LRA plays an essential role in ensuring 
its survival. If the LRA’s purpose contradicts the requirements of its environment, it is 
expected to fail to survive where it operates. The tenth hypothesis is therefore stated thus: 
H10 The LRA modifies its organization structure to fit into its environment so 
as to enhance the longevity of its undertaking. 
The assumption the author makes here is that the LRA shapes and reshapes its 
organization such that it fits the prevailing conditions in the environment. In other words, 
the LRA practices doctrinal and organizational flexibility as a survival tool. If this 
assertion is true, then there must be a link between how the LRA is organized at a 
particular time and space to survive counterinsurgent onslaught. There is data on how the 
LRA is organized over the years from the literature: these include Jane’s world 
insurgency and terrorism website (IHS),69 Christopher Day’s article,70 Heike Behrend’s 
book about Alice Lakwena and her Holy Spirit organization,71 and data from the website 
of the LRA crisis tracker.72 
                                                 
68 For full discussion on this, see Lindsay Sherwin, “Mintzberg’s Model,” Managing Change Toolkit, 
2014, accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.lindsay-sherwin.co.uk/guide_managing_change/
html_change_strategy/07_mintzberg.htm and Fred C. Lunenburg, “Organizational Structure: Mintzberg’s 
Framework,” International Journal of Scholarly, Academic, Intellectual Diversity 14, no. 1 (2012): 1–8. 
69 See details of the description in IHS, “Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA).” 
70 See full explanation in Day, “The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda,” 439–58. 
71 See detailed description in Behrend, Alice Lakwena & Holy Spirits, 183–184. 
72 See full description in Ledio Cakaj, “Evolution of LRA Command Structure,” LRA Crisis Tracker, 
2012, accessed October 23, 2015, http://lracrisistracker.com/command/evolution. 
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b. Organizational and Leadership Networks 
Organizations influence the activities and hence the lives of its members. 
Organizations, however, depend on their leaders for structuring. In other words, the 
leadership of the organization shapes the framework and, therefore, the survival of the 
organization.73 One may therefore assert that the leadership of the organization 
influences the activities and the lives of its members indirectly. 
H11 The most influential individuals in the LRA leadership network contribute 
to its longevity. 
C. METHODS 
Three methods of analysis are used to investigate the relationship between the 
LRA activities and the factors that have been thought to contribute to prolong its 
longevity. The first is visual analysis of the relationship between the plotted insurgent 
activities and the independent variable factors. This is done by using ArcGIS software 
that displays the two variables concurrently and one is able to see the relationship.74 
The second method is using quasi-Poisson regression models for the dependent 
and independent variables. This method involves dividing the countries affected by the 
LRA into equal gridded resolutions of 50km2, 100Km2, and 200Km2. Interpolates of 
data of dependent and independent variables in each grid resolution are estimated to show 
the relationship between the two datasets. The purpose of this method of analysis is to 
counter check or validates the first method that is based on visual analysis only. 
The last method involves the use of social network analysis (SNA) tools to 
analyze and determine the most influential leaders in the LRA leadership network. It also 
includes visual display of the LRA organizational structure over the years. This method 
identifies the most important leaders of the LRA and also shows how the LRA modifies 
its organization structure to evade destruction by the counterinsurgent forces. For details 
                                                 
73 See full discussion in Daft, Organization Theory and Design, 1–67. 
74 See details in ENSR, How Do You Cite ArcGIS?. 
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on how this method of analysis works, refer to Sean Everton’s book, Disrupting Dark 
Networks.75  
D. CONCLUSION 
This research is designed to use the geographical, political, and organizational and 
leadership factors to test the overall hypothesis that the LRA depends on the factors 
mentioned above to prolong the longevity of its insurgency project. It must be noted that 
the elements in each of the factors mentioned contribute as part of the collection of 
elements to have significant effects. Of course, each element has different degrees of 
effect. Nevertheless, none is adequate on its own to determine the survivability of the 
insurgent forces. 
The next chapter reports on the findings of the analysis of the variables discussed 
in this chapter. It also covers the evaluation of the results in an attempt to interpret the 
findings. The purpose of Chapter V is therefore to prepare for the conclusion and the 
recommendations thereof for this research work. 
                                                 
75 See full discussion on this in Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013) 49–315. 
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V. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND EVALUATION 
This chapter reports on the findings of the analysis of the data used in this 
research work. The results are displayed graphically, as well as in a data table format. 
Overall, the findings support the hypotheses discussed in Chapter IV with three 
exceptions—the relationship between LRA activities and the distances to mineral 
deposits, roads network, and the state capitals in each of which case the null hypothesis is 
true, contrary to the author’s hypothesizing. 
The results are presented in two sections: the first reports on the results of the 
regression models, ArcGIS, and SNA analysis of the LRA activities and the various 
factors discussed early in this work, including geographical, political, and organizational 
and leadership factors that are thought to contribute to enhancing the longevity the LRA 
insurgency project. The second provides a summary of the findings. 
A. RESULTS 
The correlation between the insurgent activities and the geographical factors are 
displayed by map plots showing the two variables concurrently. The results are further 
supported by quasi-Poisson regression models’ results, where applicable, as summarized 
in Table 1. The regression results show the dependent variable (LRA significant 
activities/events) against the covariates of the independent variables. The column for 
Model 1 shows the results for grid resolution of 50 square kilometers consisting of 2,046 
observations. Model 2 shows the results for grid resolution of 100 square kilometers 
consisting of 547 observations. Model 3 shows the results for grid resolution of 200 
square kilometers consisting of 155 observations. The implication of this is that the 
smaller the grid resolution, the larger the number of observations. However, for the 
purpose of this work, the author chose 100 square kilometers as the standard resolution 
for the baseline regression analysis because the LRA events are assumed to have 
significant effects within a radius of 100 kilometers from the point of action. Overall, the 
results become statistically less significant at higher and lower resolutions. 
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Table 1.   Quasi-Poisson Regression Results for LRA Activities 
 
 
1. Elevation (Altitude) 
According to the findings of the analysis of the variables, there is a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between height above sea level and the insurgent 
activities. As seen in Figure 1, the insurgent activities are clustered along the raised 
grounds in the region. The regression results also show positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the insurgent activities and elevation using the baseline 
model at conventional confidence level. This further supports the findings shown in 
Figure 1. At lower and higher grid resolutions than the baseline resolution of 100 square 
kilometers, the regression results are still positive but not statistically significant, 
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meaning that the elevation plays a more significant role in LRA activities at 100 
kilometer radius. 
 
Figure 1.  LRA Activities and Elevation 
Therefore, the first hypothesis (H1) that the LRA sees high grounds as having 
tactical importance (Grounds of Tactical Importance—GTIs) to enhance the longevity of 
its insurgency is supported. This finding is in agreement with previous findings by other 
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studies that suggest that elevation has a positive effect on the prevalence of armed 
conflicts.76 
2. Water Coverage 
According to the findings of the visual analysis as shown in Figure 2, there is a 
positive relationship between locations of water bodies and the LRA activities. It should 
be noted here that bigger water bodies are, however, more of a disadvantage than an 
advantage because they act as obstacles that can curtail the maneuverability of the 
insurgents. The insurgents will therefore choose water-sheds, which are normally found 
on high grounds as the most suitable sources of fresh water for all purposes. As can be 
seen in Figure 2, the activities of the insurgents are clustered around the water sheds for 
the major rivers in the region. This finding is further supported by the baseline regression 
analysis results in Table 1, which shows negative and statistically significant estimates 
for the distance to watered areas. In other words, the LRA activities occur more 
frequently near watered areas. However, this finding is not statistically significant at 200 
kilometer grid resolution, although it remained negative. 
                                                 
76 For full discussion on this, see Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the 
Duration of Civil Conflict,” 544–569; Buhaug and Rod, “Local Determinants of African Civil Wars, 1970–
2001,” 315–335; and Halvard Buhaug, “The Geography of Armed Civil Conflict - PRIO,” Peace Research 




Figure 2.  LRA Activities and Water Coverage 
This finding thus provides evidence to the second hypothesis (H2) that the LRA’s 
insurgency project is significantly supported by the water coverage in the East and 
Central African region, thus contributing to its longevity. This finding is also consistent 
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with the findings of Buhaug et al. and of Fearon and Laitin, although the latter talked of 
terrain in general terms.77 
3. Vegetation (Landcover) 
The findings of this research work shows that there is a positive association 
relationship between the density of the land cover and the intensity of activities of the 
LRA insurgents. The results are displayed visually in Figure 3. Careful observation also 
shows that the insurgent activities are clustered in areas that are moderately covered. In 
other words, very thick vegetation and very less dense vegetation are unsuitable for the 
insurgents. This is probably because the thick vegetation is an obstacle to free 
maneuverability, as well as being less inhabitable to humans. The less thick vegetation, 
on the other hand, does not offer the tactical and social advantages associated with 
moderate vegetation covers. 
                                                 
77 See full discussions in Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” 75–90 and 
Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict,” 544–69. 
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Figure 3.  LRA Activities and Landcover 
This finding therefore supports the third hypothesis (H3) that the LRA uses the 
land cover in the region socially and tactically to enhance the longevity of its insurgency 
project. 
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4. Mineral Resources 
The results of the analysis show that there is a positive relationship between the 
activities of the insurgents and distance to the locations of mineral deposits. In Figure 4 
shows that where the minerals are deposited is not where some of the LRA activities are 
found, except in parts of the DRC and CAR. This finding is further supported by positive 
coefficients across model 1 and model 2 regression results in Table 1 with statistically 
significant estimates at conventional confidence levels. The meaning of this is that the 
LRA activities are more frequent at distant places from the locations of the mineral 
deposits, therefore suggesting that the LRA does not rely on minerals to support its 




Figure 4.  LRA Activities and Mineral Resources 
This finding therefore rejects the fourth hypothesis (H4) and supports the null 
hypothesis that the LRA does not fund its insurgency project using mineral deposits in 
the region. This finding is contrary to the findings of Buhaug and co-authors that 
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insurgents depend on mineral resources in the operation area to sustain their insurgency 
project.78 
There is an unconfirmed report that shows that the LRA has dealings in wildlife 
resources such as elephant tusks (ivory) and other related benefits.79 The fact that the 
LRA has continued to operate in Garamba National Park may attest to this claim. The 
regression results in Table 1 include a “resources” variable, which includes wildlife 
resources. However, the coefficients are positive as well, which do not support H4 and 
are consistent with the results for mineral deposits.  
5. Road Networks 
According to the results of the analysis, the LRA activities are clustered in areas 
that are heavily networked with roads. The result shown in Figure 5 clearly supports this 
argument, although northern DRC does not have the roads network, as seen in South 
Sudan and northern Uganda. This claim is further supported by the regression models 
shown in Table 1. There are consistent negative and statistically significant estimates for 
the distance to roads on the activities of the insurgents. The results are statistically 
significant at conventional confidence levels for 50km and 100km grid resolutions, but 
not for 200km grid resolution. 
                                                 
78 See detailed explanation in Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala, “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the 
Duration of Civil Conflict,” 544–569. 




Figure 5.  LRA Activities and Roads Network 
Therefore, the fifth hypothesis (H5) that the road networks in the region do not 
contribute to the enhancement of the longevity of the LRA insurgency is rejected. This 
finding, however, agrees with the findings of Rabasa and co-authors of the RAND 
Corporation that insurgents operating in ungoverned spaces require roads infrastructure to 
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facilitate their operations.80 The interpretation of this could be that the civilian population 
and the counterinsurgent forces in the region are settled alongside the roads, and it 
therefore follows that most of the significant activities, which are the interaction between 
the LRA and counterinsurgents, or between the LRA and civilians, are recorded near 
roads. Ideally, it is the counterinsurgents that require roads because they use combat 
vehicles that rely on roads for smoother and faster operations. Civilians also need the 
roads to commute from one location to another in the region. The insurgents, on the other 
hand, mainly move on foot and use small arms as their main choice of weapons.  
6. Distance to the Capital (Kampala) 
According to the findings shown in Figure 6, the LRA activities are generally 
negatively associated with the distance to the capital of Uganda. That is, the LRA 
operates near the location of the capital. This finding is further supported by the results of 
the regression models shown in Table 1, which indicate consistent negative and 
significant estimates for the distance to Kampala. The results are statistically significant 
at conventional confidence levels across all the three models. 
                                                 
80 For full discussion on this, see Rabasa et al., Ungoverned Territories, 1–44. 
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Figure 6.  LRA Activities and Location of State Capitals 
This finding rejects the sixth hypothesis (H6) that the LRA does not operate near 
state capitals. The interpretation of this result could be because the insurgent activities are 
located closer to Kampala, the capital of Uganda, relative to the window of the analysis, 
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which includes the borders of all the four countries (Uganda, Sudan, the DRC, and CAR) 
as a unitary area of analysis. In that case, Kampala is much closer to the activities of the 
LRA, but within the borders of Uganda alone, it may not be true. 
7. Population Density 
According to the results shown in Figure 7, the LRA operates in areas that are 
moderately populated. The border areas in all the affected countries have minimal 
population density, which is suitable sanctuary for insurgents. This finding is supported 
by the baseline regression model results of the 100-kilometer as well as that of 50-
kilometer grid resolutions, which show negative coefficients for estimates of population 
density against insurgent activities, which are statistically significant at conventional 




Figure 7.  LRA Activities and Population Density 
This finding supports the seventh hypothesis (H7) that the LRA operates in 
moderately populated areas to insure the longevity of its insurgency project. 
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8. State Economy 
The finding for the relationship between the state economy, which in this case is 
measured in terms of several factors that are collectively called fragility index, and the 
insurgent activities, is positive. As shown in Figure 8, the countries that rated higher 
fragility index are the ones that the LRA favored as sanctuary—indicated by more 
frequent LRA activities. This could be partly the reason that the LRA decided to relocate 
to the DRC and CAR after 2006, instead of moving eastwards to Kenya or Ethiopia, 
despite the lack of obstacles on that route. 
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Figure 8.  LRA Activities and Fragile States Index 
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This finding supports the eighth hypothesis (H8) that the LRA prolonged its 
insurgency project by selectively operating in states that are fragile or weak. This finding 
is further supported by the regression models’ results for distance to state borders, which 
are negative, meaning that the insurgents operate more frequently near the state border 
areas. Although these results are not statistically significant at 200-kilometer grid 
resolution, they give some clues. Another interesting observation in Figure 8 is that after 
the LRA invaded the CAR, its fragility index worsened. This is in agreement with the 
findings of Idean Salehyan that transnational insurgents crisscross international borders 
and that states that are neighbored by weak states riddled with civil conflicts are likely to 
catch the conflict as well.81 
9. State Rivalry 
From the table of interstate rivals compiled by William R. Thompson, it is 
Uganda and Sudan that have been captured as rivals from 1963 to 1972 and again from 
1994 to 1999.82 Uganda invaded the DRC from 1997 to 2003, but since then, the two 
states have had a cordial relationship.83 This suggests that the LRA actually used the 
rivalry between Uganda and Sudan to sustain its insurgency and provides support to the 
ninth hypothesis (H9) that the LRA uses rival states as sanctuaries to prolong the 
longevity of its insurgency project. 
10. Organizational Structure 
From the time of its founding, 1988 to 1997, the LRA’s organizational structure 
has been based on simple mechanistic bureaucracy typical of a conventional military 
formation. It was also an unstable organization structure because the high command 
exercised direct control of the operating core. This structure is shown in Figure 9.84 
                                                 
81 For full discussion on this, see Salehyan, Rebels without Borders; Salehyan, “Transnational 
Insurgencies and the Escalation of Regional Conflict: Lessons for Iraq and Afghanistan.” 
82 See detailed explanation in Thompson, “Identifying Rivals and Rivalries in World Politics,” 557–
86. 
83 For full discussion on this, see “Congo: The First and Second Wars, 1996–2003 | Enough Project.” 
Accessed March 26, 2015, http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/congo-first-and-second-wars-1996-2003. 
84 See full description of this in Behrend, Alice Lakwena & Holy Spirits, 179–190. 
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Figure 9.  The Organization Structure of LRA between 1988 and 199785 
From 1998 to 2001, the LRA’s organization was more complex and based on 
professional bureaucracy. This was after it discarded the Holy Spirit tactics and adopted 
formal, classical guerrilla warfare after it received professional training from the Sudan 
Armed Forces (SAF), as seen in Figure 10.86 
                                                 
85 Ibid. 
86 See full descriptions of this in Ledio Cakaj et al., “Evolution of LRA Command Structure,” LRA 
Crisis Tracker, 2014, accessed October 23, 2014, http://lracrisistracker.com/command/evolution and Day, 
“The Fates of Rebels: Insurgencies in Uganda,” 439–458. 
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Figure 10.  Organization Structure of LRA between 1998 and 200187 
Between 2001 and 2005, Sudan granted Uganda permission to cross its borders to 
pursue the LRA in southern Sudan. The LRA dismantled its organization structure and 
operated in small groups, each reporting directly to the high command. This is a 
divisional type of organization. The LRA uses this type of organizational structure to 
become, literally, invisible to its enemy. It offers no frontline to the counterinsurgent 
forces to engage; its members are nowhere but everywhere. In other words, the LRA 
practiced strategic centralization and tactical decentralization.88 
From 2006 to 2008, the LRA again organized itself into simple and mechanistic 
bureaucracy. All the other structures are there but somehow rendered redundant because 
the high command preferred to have direct control of the operational core and not through 
                                                 
87 After Cakaj et al., “Evolution of LRA Command Structure.” 
88 For full description of this, see IHS, “Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)”; Cakaj et al., “Evolution of 
LRA Command Structure.” 
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the middle line structure (see Figure 11).89 This is an example of doctrinal flexibility 
applied to guarantee the survival of an insurgency project. 
 
Figure 11.  Organization Structure of LRA between 2006 and 200890 
After Uganda conducted Operation Lightning Thunder (OLT) in 2008, the LRA 
reverted back to the divisional type of organization—strategic centralization and tactical 
decentralization. It operated in small groups, each reporting directly to the High 
Command. It has maintained this structure up to the time of the writing of this work.  
Although it is impossible to demonstrate that the ways in which the LRA adapted 
its organizational structure to the prevailing military situation contributed to its longevity 
(H10), the results of this analysis are consistent with this assertion. The LRA practiced 
doctrinal flexibility involving emphasis on strategic centralization and tactical 
                                                 
89 See full descriptions in Cakaj et al., “Evolution of LRA Command Structure” and IHS, “Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA).” 
90 After IHS, “Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)” and Cakaj et al., “Evolution of LRA Command 
Structure.” 
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decentralization to survive counterinsurgent onslaught. The evidence used to derive these 
LRA organization structures are those provided by the authors cited. There is no way of 
verifying this claim other than using documentary evidence sourced directly from the 
LRA leadership, which is not available.  
11. Key Leaders in the LRA Leadership Network 
Figure 12 is a sociogram showing the network of the LRA leadership. The nodes 
or actors that are marked blue are those that are no longer involved in active insurgency. 
That is, they are either dead (marked with a + sign) or alive but surrendered or captured 
(marked with blue circle). Those still in active in the insurgency are marked in red. Small 
red circles indicate leaders who are staff officers, while bigger red circles are 
commanders. Overall, the network is centered on Joseph Kony as the commander in chief 
of the LRA. The other influential commanders are shown in Table 2, which presents the 
results of centrality measures for degree, closeness, betweenness, and eigenvector. The 
ranking of each commander alludes to the order of their importance in the LRA 
organization. The first seven (marked in red) are the key leaders that have the most 
influence in the organization. 
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Figure 12.  The Sociogram of the LRA Command Network 




Although the results do not prove the last hypothesis, H11, they are consistent 
with it. They indicate that the LRA leadership network is centered around Joseph Kony, 
and the centrality analysis further supports the claim that Kony and a few of his close 
commanders including Okot Odhiambo, Alphonse Lamola, Onencan Aciro kop, Dominic 
Ongwen, Richard (single name identified), and John Bosco Kibwola are the movers and 
shakers of the LRA organization. Again, this analysis is based on the evidence derived 
from the references used to code the SNA data. What is quite clear is that the LRA 
leadership practices doctrinal and organizational flexibility of strategic centralization and 
tactical decentralization so as to benefit from the advantages of decentralized forces, 
which are hard to contain or destroy while maintaining a centralized leadership for firm 
control. This is not contrary to John Arquilla’s argument that decentralized groups are 
more effective than the centralized ones.91 The LRA actually benefits from 
decentralization while maintaining strategic (high command) advantages associated with 
centralization. 
B. CONCLUSION  
In general, the results show that the LRA makes use of its surrounding 
environment, which includes the physical features such as the elevation, water sources 
and land cover, and the human geography factor such as the population density. The LRA 
also made use of the interstate politics and the weaknesses of the states in the region to 
gain some time for its insurgency project. The findings of this work further confirm that 
the LRA modifies its organizational structure to adapt to the changing military and 
political situations so as to evade termination by the counterinsurgent forces. This, 
however, cannot be possible without the intuition of the LRA leadership, meaning that 
the LRA leadership plays important role in making decisions that contribute significantly 
to the longevity of its undertaking. 
Contrary to the author’s hypotheses, the findings of this work suggest that the 
LRA does not depend on mineral deposits in the operation area to fund its insurgency 
                                                 
91 For full discussion on this, see John Arquilla, Swarming and the Future of Conflict (Rand 
Corporation, 2000), 25–89. 
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project. The results also show that the LRA operates, in general, at the proximity of the 
state capital, contrary to the hunch of the author. The LRA further operates at the 
proximity of the roads in the region. However, this could be due to the fact that the events 
recorded are mostly encounters with counterinsurgent forces and civilian population, 
which are, incidentally, nearby roads. Counterinsurgent forces prefer locating their 
defensive positions near access routes for the purpose of easy supplies. Civilians, as well, 
prefer to settle near roads for easy access and protection by the counterinsurgent forces. It 
is therefore inevitable that the records should show the insurgent activities near roads. 
However, this does not mean the insurgents exclusively rely on roads for their operations.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research was designed to determine whether the LRA uses the geographical, 
political, and organizational and leadership factors suggested by previous research works 
as survival enhancement incentives. The findings here show that, indeed, the LRA, like 
other insurgent groups, depends on most, but not all, of the geographical, political, and 
organizational factors to prolong its longevity. Thus, these findings give clues to 
governments and counterinsurgent forces battling the LRA as to how the LRA keeps its 
insurgency project surviving. Through this knowledge, it is hoped that the concerned 
policy makers—African states and their partner, the U.S.—will develop sound strategic 
solution to the LRA crisis. 
In the sections that follow, the author discusses the synthesis and implications of 
the findings of this research work, the limitations encountered, and options for further 
research work, and make practicable recommendations for policy makers. Last but not 
least, the final section draws an overall conclusion to this thesis work. 
A. SYNTHESIS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
The Ugandan Military (UPDF) has been battling the LRA since late 1980s up 
until the writing of this research work. The UPDF mostly depends on intelligence 
information and analysis to combat the LRA. Uganda, at large, also relies on intelligence 
information and analysis to assess the progress of the war against the LRA insurgency, 
and formulates strategic courses of action on that basis. This research gives another 
perspective on how to study the LRA insurgency based on readily available, open-source 
information, empirical analysis, and is supported by previous knowledge on similar 
insurgency projects. It is therefore hoped that combining the findings and 
recommendations in this work with intelligence information will help Uganda and other 
affected African states to formulate better strategies to combat the LRA insurgency. 
The LRA, according to the findings of this work, makes good use of its 
environment to keep surviving. This is not surprising because even wild animals, quite 
intuitively, use their surroundings to facilitate their survival. It is, however, important to 
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note that not all humans are capable of surviving in the same environment for such a long 
duration without making concessions for peace talks to succeed. This means that the LRA 
has mastered how to adapt and live comfortably in harsh environments such as the thick 
and rough terrain in the DRC and CAR. The LRA has clearly demonstrated expertise in 
the selection of sanctuaries that guarantee its prolonged longevity.  
Countering the LRA by denying it access to life-supporting environmental 
factors, however, may not be so feasible because it will be a daunting task to try, for 
instance, to deny the LRA access to water sources, wood supplies, and raised grounds. 
This is because these geographical features are plentiful and spread throughout the 
region. It will require enormous human and other types of resources to accomplish such a 
task. This means that other measures should be opted for as a solution to the LRA 
insurgency. 
The LRA, according to the findings of this research, also takes opportunities 
presented to it by the prevailing political situations in the region. That is, it chooses 
sanctuaries based on the capability of the hosting state or host state’s relationship with 
Uganda. For example, as seen earlier in this work, from 1988 to 2005, the LRA had 
sanctuaries inside southern Sudan and parts of Uganda that are less populated or 
completely uninhabited. This was because Uganda and Sudan had competing interests, 
which played quite well for the LRA’s survival. After 2006, the LRA decided to relocate 
to the DRC and later to CAR because these two countries do not have the capability to 
police their borders effectively. 
It should be noted that the LRA did not choose the DRC and CAR by 
coincidence. It had the easy option of going eastwards to Kenya, Ethiopia, or Somalia, 
rather than crossing the Nile, an obstacle, to go westwards to the DRC and CAR. The 
most probable reasons are that, when compared to the countries in the western side, the 
countries on the eastern side are densely populated, with rougher terrain and stronger 
state power, and friendlier to the Ugandan government. Therefore, cordial interstate 
relationships and concerted efforts to combat insurgents in the region could be an 
agreeable solution to that effect. That is by denying havens to the insurgents. 
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Another strategy that the LRA uses to prolong its longevity is that of changing its 
organizational and leadership structures according to the prevailing military and political 
situations. For instance, as discussed earlier in this work, the LRA constructs its 
organization structure similar to that of a professional bureaucracy when it had gained 
strength and is able to face the counterinsurgent onslaught. However, it dismantles the 
same organization down to smaller units when it is faced with possible defeat and 
termination. This tactic affords the LRA survival because it is hard for the well-organized 
counterinsurgent forces to fight an insurgent that is disintegrated into smaller fighting 
groups.  
The LRA seems to know very well that this tactic works and incapacitates the 
advanced force advantage that the counterinsurgency forces have over it. This could be 
one of the reasons why the LRA leader, Joseph Kony, preferred to maintain direct control 
over the core operatives when they reorganized into a more mechanistic bureaucracy after 
2006. After Operation Lightning Thunder, it was easy for the LRA to revert back to small 
groups, divisional style organization, which it still uses at the time of this writing. 
According to Brafman and Beckstrom, the best way to fight an organization that operates 
in small units is to self-divide into smaller units corresponding to the target 
organization.92 Will this strategy work in the military setting? This is another research 
question altogether. The author thinks the best way to control water in a flooded house, as 
an analogy, is first to shut the tap from which the water originates before mopping it; 
otherwise, it will be a waste of time and effort. In other words, when the insurgents are 
nowhere and everywhere, the best strategy is to go for the control center: high command 
manhunt. Because much as the groups operates independently, they still report to and are 
controlled by the high command. 
B. LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
There are a number of challenges that the author encountered while trying to 
conduct this research. One very important limitation is lack of availability of data, let 
alone being up to date, on most African countries. There is general lack of knowledge on 
                                                 
92 See full discussion in Brafman and Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider, 159–209. 
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several African issues because of lack of research works, which also stems from lack of 
data for conducting the research study. The author sees great opportunity in creating a 
project that specializes in data collection on African issues. If the world desires to know 
more about Africa, it has no choice but to fund data collection projects. 
From the results of the data analysis, it is seen that most of the countries in the 
region are categorized as fragile states. However, neither are all the states riddled with 
insurgency, nor do insurgents find them suitable sanctuaries. Furthermore, some states 
that were previously destabilized by insurgency managed to push out the insurgents from 
within their territories. The author sees a great research opportunity in the area of 
effectiveness of governance in the region. Why do some of the states have ungoverned 
spaces, and how can they reduce the prevalence of those ungoverned spaces so as to get 
rid of insurgency in their sovereign territory?  
The author is grateful to the LRA Crisis Tracker for collecting data on the LRA 
and participating in the struggle to end the insurgency. However, the author thinks that 
the LRA command data as provided by the LRA Crisis Tracker requires some updating. 
There are, most probably, younger LRA commanders less known to the world that are 
slowly but surely taking mantle of the insurgency. It is therefore prudent that more efforts 
should be directed towards identifying those upcoming leaders and their biographies. 
This will, in turn, facilitate more credible analysis and evaluation of the LRA insurgency. 
C. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This research has provided supporting evidence that the LRA uses its 
environment to facilitate the longevity of its insurgency project, meaning that, it relies, 
partly, on geography to survive. It is therefore recommended that the counterinsurgent 
forces consider deploying strategically in positions that have resources that provide 
livelihood to the insurgents, especially water sources. However, this means more 
manpower is needed to cover all the water sources in the region. Foot patrols may also be 
used to enhance domination of the territory. This will deny the insurgents access to those 
critical resources and thus pressure them to give up the insurgency. 
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The LRA is unlikely to relocate to another state other than where it is right now. 
Further north is desert terrain, which the LRA is not used to. Further west is Cameroon, 
which is a formidable state, according to African standards, and it is likely to fight and 
deny the LRA sanctuary. To the east and south there are the joint African Union forces, 
which means that the LRA can be defeated kinetically, if the CAR, DRC, South Sudan, 
Sudan, and Uganda can work jointly and effectively under the African Union regional 
task force. It appears that the challenge right now is the lack of manpower to cover the 
vast territory in which the LRA is roaming. This recommendation can be implemented 
with good results if the strength of the counterinsurgent forces is boosted. 
The LRA has, as of this writing, decided to break up its organization structure. It 
operates in small divisional groups that report directly to the high command of the LRA. 
The author thinks the best way to defeat such an insurgency project is to identify the key 
players—the movers and shakers—of the insurgency and eliminate them from the 
equation. Eliminating the connection to the high command will most probably cause the 
organization to crumble because the groups won’t have the direction and purpose of 
fighting. The challenge with this recommendation is to find the apparently invisible high 
command members. A multifaceted approach may have to be used to locate and capture 
the leaders of the insurgency. This may include phone tracking, human intelligence, 
signal intelligence, and drones, among other methods.  
The most cost-effective method that the author thinks can end the LRA 
insurgency is the use of psychological operation methods to encourage mass defection 
from the LRA ranks. The LRA high command will have no one to command if the 
fighters defect, and the high command itself will have no choice but to give up the 
undertaking. This method will not only be, as Gordon McCormick would say, a “strong 
win,” but it would be a “complete win” as well, because the leadership of the LRA won’t 
have that motivation to continue to fight if there are no people to use as fighters.93 In 
short, we must capitalize on degrading Joseph Kony’s fighting strength—manpower—
                                                 
93 For full explanation, see Gordon H. McCormick, “The Complete Win,” in Gangs and Guerrillas, 
ed. Michael Freeman and Hy Rothstein, Chapter 1 (Monterey, CA: NPS, 2011), 3–7. 
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because that is what keeps him motivated, surviving, and busy running the insurgency 
project.  
The data on the LRA is getting outdated. The LRA most probably is changing 
face in terms of new commanders taking the mantle of the LRA leadership. Data 
collectors have to research more and update their data on the LRA to unveil the identities 
and biographies of the upcoming LRA leaders. The more we keep track of the LRA 
leadership, the easier it is to derive effective strategies to end the insurgency. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The LRA insurgency is the oldest of all insurgent projects in Africa, lasting for 
over a quarter of a century. Several theories have been put forward by different 
government and non-governmental organizations to explain why the LRA has been able 
to survive for such a long duration. Academics also have their own theories as to why and 
how insurgents in general prolong the longevity of their insurgency project. The author 
designed an empirical study to find out why and how the LRA has prolonged the 
longevity of its insurgency project for such a long duration. 
The findings of this study support the hypotheses that the LRA uses its 
environment to facilitate its survival by socially and tactically harnessing the life-
supporting elements of nature. It does this by carefully selecting the terrain of operation, 
which provides it with a tactical advantage over the counterinsurgent forces, and 
implementing social survival incentives. The LRA also takes into account the prevailing 
political and military situations in the region before selecting a territory for its activities. 
For instance, between the late 1980s and 2005, the LRA took advantage of the rivalry 
between Uganda and Sudan to gain sanctuaries in Sudan. Later, after 2006, the LRA 
carefully chose to relocate to the DRC and CAR instead of Ethiopia and Kenya because 
the former are more fragile states than the latter. It is apparently easier for an insurgent 
group to survive in a fragile state than in a sturdy one. The LRA also modifies its 
organization structure to fit to the prevailing political and military situation. When under 
pressure from counterinsurgent forces, the LRA breaks up into smaller groups to evade 
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destruction, and vice versa. The LRA has used this philosophy over the years to prolong 
the longevity of its insurgency project. 
Last but not least, this study focused on the LRA in particular, but there are 
several other insurgent groups out there with similar or completely different ideologies 
and doctrines of operations. The author recommends that other people interested in 
conflict studies undertake these projects. Until such studies are conducted, it will be very 
difficult to state assertively a theory of insurgent survival. The challenge may also arise 
from the constantly changing political and military situations in Africa. The changes in 
the situations inevitably pressure insurgents to change tactics. This further complicates 
the quest to formulate a standing theory of insurgent survival.  
Conducting a research study on Africa or its member states is a very challenging 
task, due mostly to lack of data on basic issues affecting the continent. The author 
therefore thinks that if one really wants to know more about Africa, more must be done to 
fund data collection projects to unveil the vast information hidden in that vast continent. 
The rest of the work of analysis and evaluation of the data will be done by institutions of 
higher learning. 
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A. LIST OF SPIRITS USING KONY AS A MEDIUM 
The following list gives the names of the spirits that Joseph Kony claims 
communicate and act through him as a sole medium. Whenever he is possessed by one of 
the spirits, Kony wears a white kanzu (long white robe) and a rosary around his neck and 
communicates while standing at the yard (a “holy” place surrounding the Alter). Clerks 
record whatever he says because he won’t remember after the spirit is gone.  The 
following are the names of the spirits that operated through Kony: 
1. Juma Oris: a minister under President Idi Amin (1971–1979); this was 
Kony’s chief spirit and chairman. 
2. Silli Silindi: a female spirit in charge of operations. 
3. Ing Chu: a Chinese or Korean spirit who controls the bullets of the enemy. 
4. El wel Best: another Chinese or Korean spirit in charge of battle plans and 
tactics. 
5. Silver Koni: a spirit from Zaire (the current DRC) also in charge of 
controlling enemy bullets. 
6. King Bruce: a spirit from the U.S. in charge of the support component of 
the resistance movement. 
7. Major Bianca: a female spirit from the U.S. responsible for the yard. 
8. Jim Brickey: another spirit from the U.S. responsible for secret 
intelligence. 
9. Doctor Salam or Saline: the spirit in charge of medical services. 
10. Other spirits with no details were Ali and Jacob.94 
B. OTHER SPIRITS AND THEIR MEDIUM CO-OPTED BY KONY 
Unlike Alice Auma, who was the only medium of all spirits in her movement, 
Joseph Kony allowed and accepted other people with different spirits. However, he co-
opted them into his movement. The following are some of the spirit mediums and their 
respective spirits Kony co-opted into his movement: 
1. Nelson Odora was possessed by the spirit Maliaka (Angel) Gabriel. 
Gabriel had the power of predicting enemy movements and controlling 
their fired bombs. He had a following of 30–50 people. 
2. Odora worked with two other men possessed by Saint Paul and Saint John 
the Baptist. These men had the power of healing and preaching the gospel. 
                                                 
94 Heike Behrend, Alice Lakwena & the Holy Spirits, 185–86. 
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3. Poline Angom, a female, was possessed by 12 spirits, each responsible for 
different tasks, who worked for Kony’s movement. 
4. Santa Lawino, another female, was also possessed by 12 spirits who 
worked for Kony.95 
C. THE HOLY SPIRIT SAFETY PRECAUTIONS 
The Holy Spirit safety precautions were adopted from Alice Auma’s movement, 
the Holy Spirit Movement. Kony did not have his own spiritual precautions. Possibly, 
this explains why he enforced it reluctantly to discipline his forces. The Holy Spirit safety 
precautions are as follows: 
1. Thou shalt not have any kind of charms or remains of small sticks in your 
pocket, including small pieces used as toothbrush. 
2. Thou shalt not smoke cigarettes. 
3. Thou shalt not drink alcohol. 
4. Thou shalt not commit adultery or fornication. 
5. Thou shalt not quarrel or fight with anybody. 
6. Thou shalt not steal. 
7. Thou shalt not have envy or jealousy. 
8. Thou shalt not kill. 
9. You will execute the orders and only the orders of the Spirit. 
10. Thou shalt not carry any walking stick in the battle field. 
11. Thou shalt not take cover on the ground, in the grass, behind trees, ant-hill 
or any other obstacle there found. 
12. Thou shalt not pick from the battle field any article not recommended by 
the Spirit. 
13. Thou shalt not kill prisoners of war. 
14. Thou shalt follow the right words of command, and never argue with the 
commander. 
15. You shalt love one another as you love yourselves. 
16. Thou shalt not kill snakes of any kind. 
17. Thou shalt not eat food with anybody who has not been sworn in by the 
Holy Spirit. 
18. Thou shalt not branch off to any home or shake hands with anybody while 
on route to the battlefield. 
19. Thou shalt not eat pork or mutton or oil of the same. 
20. Thou shall have two testicles, neither more nor less.96 
                                                 
95 Behrend, Alice Lakwena & Holy Spirits, 186. 
96 Ibid, 47. 
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D. ORGANIZATIONS AND UNITS CO-OPTED TO FORM THE LRA 
By the time the LRA was finally founded in 1992, it had co-opted a number of 
other insurgent organizations into its ranks. Kony and some of the insurgent leaders from 
the Acholi region had agreed to consolidate their forces and confront the NRA with a 
single organization. The following are the organizations that comprised the LRA: 
1. UPDA unit under Odong Latek 
2. UPDA unit under Okello Okeno 
3. UPDA unit under Benjamin Opia 
4. UPDA unit under Mark Lapyem 
5. Splinter groups of HSM of Severino Lukoya 
6. Splinter groups of HSMF of Alice Auma 
7. The Holy Spirit movement of Philip Ojuk 
8. The Lord’s Army of Joseph Kony 
9. The United Uganda Godly Movement (UUGM) of Otunu Lukonyomoi 
10. UPDCA of Joseph Kony97  
                                                 
97 Ibid, 179–190. 
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